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October 2001: Why did the PNC lose the election? The answer lies within three frameworks. 1. The history of the PNC and the history of party politics in Guyana. 2. The reality of Guyana's political sociology. 3. Specific factors since 1997. I now discuss each of these categories separately.
Party Politics
The split of the united PPP into PPP and PNC in the fifties did not affect the intellectual resources of either of these two branches of party politics in Guyana. Guyana at that time was overflowing with intellectual talent. Both the PNC and PPP had its share of lawyers, doctors, professionals and academics. After Burnham sidelined Rawle Farley and John Carter and assumed complete dominance of the PNC and Guyana, the PNC's intellectual base became thin and eventually disappeared. The reason for this was Burnham's overwhelming personality and willingness to merge party and leader. From 1964 to his death in 1985, the government of Guyana employed erudite men and women but they served the state not the PNC.
Here is where I make the controversial claim that despite the existence of the paramountcy of the party over state, in the Burnham government, there was no successful spill over into the party of the service of the state intellectuals. For example, Sonny Ramphal was never a party man. Intellectuals came on board to work in the nationalised industries and in the extended bureaucracy and public sector but not for the PNC as such. Naturally, many of them found themselves being close to the PNC but they were closer to the man Burnham and not his party. There was one and only one reason for this Burnham was the PNC and the PNC was Burnham. Why bother with party when social elevation can come from playing up to Burnham. But despite his political finesse and his uncanny political astuteness, Burnham couldn't see that he was denuding the PNC of intellectual analysts. At one time in the PNC, Burnham's two deputy leaders were Reid and Green - they weren't intellectual planners and thinkers. When the eighties came, and the economic and social infrastructure collapsed, the PNC consisted of underlings and sycophants. There was no real intellectual talent.
When Burnham died and global democratisation came, the PNC got confused at how best to deal with this new situation. Green was insisting on a continuation of bullyish tactics while Hoyte was engaged in trying to please the Green faction and the West. After 1992, the intellectual void became more manifest. Between 1993 and the time of Jagan's death, the PNC was staring at party decline and party deterioration. A confluence of strange events conspired to save the physical integrity of the PNC since 1997. The intellectual planners were missing and this had its effect on the PNC's performance in both elections in 1997 and 2001. I will tie this in with the third framework.
Before I enter the second category, it must be noted that the intellectual decline of the PNC saw a simultaneous decay in academic talent in the PPP too. Cheddi Jagan's insecurity and ideological mistrust of intellectuals manifested itself in the abundance of mediocrity inside the PPP leadership. When the eighties came, Jagan was surrounded by a group of PPP cadres, a majority of them having no interest in attending university or related educational institutions. Cheddi was the party and the party was Cheddi. If you wanted to climb the ladder at Freedom House then just speak the language of Cheddi. When beyond their wildest expectations, the PPP got power at the end of 1992, the Guyana Government cabinet became one of the most uneducated in the world and a laughing stock in Guyana. So devoid was the PPP of intellectual spin-doctors that the coterie of businessmen that they took within their fold brutally manipulated them while laughing behind their backs. This essay is not on the PPP so we return to the PNC and turn to the second framework.
Guyana's political sociology
This needs no intricate explanation. The PNC, despite Hoyte's overtures to a section of the Indian community between 1988 and 1992, could not have won the 2001 elections. The race psyche determines how people vote in Guyana. Not even a schoolboy would argue with this so it makes no sense developing this theme. I now turn to the third thesis and the most important section of my argument.
Specific factors since 1997
The PNC could not have won the just concluded elections but it could have seriously undermined the power base of the PPP by engendering a minority PPP government. A minority PPP government was definitely on the horizon as stated in Bisram's first poll. If the PNC knows it couldn't have won the elections, its best strategy was to work for a PPP minority in parliament. It hardly needs stating that a minority government would have meant an enhanced PNC power base. What the PNC actually did was to help the PPP achieve a majority and the reason is that the PNC did not have intellectual thinkers to guide the party. The PNC's methodologies to win the elections was at best disgraceful and childish.
First, it must be noted that given the evolution of society in Guyana, there is something called an East Indian psyche and an African psyche. Does the PPP understand the African psyche? Does the PNC understand the Indian psyche? Let me repeat, this paper is about the PNC so I will answer the question in relation to that party. The answer is no. If it did it would have a better showing at the poll increasing significantly its 41% from 1997. If it did, it would not have unwittingly caused a PPP majority.
Indian people in this country have two fears borne out of historical circumstances. They mistrust the PNC and they fear anti-Indian violence. Raphael Trotman uniquely picked up on the first one when he said the PNC should offer an apology to Guyanese for its long rule. He was on the right track but he got shot down by his leadership. The PNC's position is that we ain't apologising for anything since the PPP did worst than us since 1992. But the PPP has the numbers to win a free and fair poll, it is the PNC that has to wrack its brains to win one. Once the election campaign started, with the problems with the rice industry and crime, the PNC should have offered the apology in the hope of coming across as changed people to Indians. It was a golden moment that the PNC let pass and it cost them dearly.
Secondly, the Channel 9 " rap artists" damaged the PNC's credibility and image badly during the campaign. If ever there was a time the PNC needed the intellectual sagacity of Burnham it was during this election campaign. What the Channel 9 rappers did was to evoke those two characteristics that reside inside the East Indian psyche. PPP analysts were just enjoying what Channel 9 was doing for the PPP's election campaign. And no one in the PNC could have seen this dangerous, self-destructive road.
What the Channel 9 preachers did was to appeal to the converts. The PNC didn't need this. The converts were ready for March 19. They knew what they had to do. It were the undecided voters, the disenchanted Indians and the confused middle class elements that the PNC needed either to win the election or create a minority PPP government. But the PNC let loose the Channel 9 outfit on the Guyanese people and only PNC supporters cheer them on. The PNC must be having nightmares when they look at the results. The PPP has a three lead majority over the combined opposition making for a total of 18, 000 votes difference. That difference would not have happened if it wasn't for Channel 9. Channel 9 caused Dev to lose a seat and the combined opposition to lose maybe the other two. As the Channel 9 rappers moved in for the kill, the Indians dumped Nadir and Dev and moved back to the PPP. Bisram's first poll gave the PPP a minority government, his second a majority. Between the first and second poll, the Channel 9 rappers played a crucial role that hurt the PNC.
Thirdly, an extremely interesting development emerged after the 2001 election that hasn't been looked at as yet. The election results show that 1115 security personnel whose names were on the voters' list did not turn up to vote. Those were PNC votes. The security forces have become alienated from the PNC. The PNC, over a three year period, has dramatically and brutally humiliated the security forces. The officer ranks in the joint services don't want to hear about kit and kin. They are just turned off at the incessant abuse of their characters by the PNC and the television rap artists. This is a crucial loss for the PNC. The security forces have always been electorally pro-PNC; the results for 1997 are clear for all to see they voted overwhelmingly for the PNC. The security forces and the PNC constitute two of the most fundamental pillars of the Guyanese society. It made no sense for one of these institutions to so derogate the other. The question we will never have answered is that if the PNC had won the election, would the security forces, especially the police, have accepted the PNC as their boss?
Fourthly, the birth of the Reform component did not do much, if anything at all, for the image of the PNC. I would go so far as to say that the political deportment of the Reform wing reinforced the stereotypes certain voters had of the PNC causing these undecided voters to vote for the PPP, ROAR and Sharma.
Certain businessmen felt (whether rightly or wrongly) that the Reform attachment was in fact a deception by the PNC. The Reform movement 's sudden appearance was viewed in a positive light by the society. The society's perception was that it was a moderate, liberal body of business people, professionals and academics who would put a human face to the PNC. But as it turned out during the campaign, there were more human faces in the PNC itself than in the Reform. While Raphel Trotman, Sherwood Lowe, Debra Backer came across as new, independent PNC leaders who understood the nuances of Guyanese politics, the Reform behaved as if they were the messengers of the PNC. The Reform said nothing during the campaign that indicated to voters that they had any influence on/in the PNC, that they were of a different ideological complexion and that they were willing to be identified as a novel set of actors ready to insert themselves in the rebirth of political culture in Guyana. After the campaign, in the heat of the violence, they disappeared and the society was saved by these new moderate PNC leaders who were in fact the real reformers. I believe Guyana has seen or will see the disappearance of THE REORM.
The PNC must be having enormous regrets at the post-mortem analysis especially when they compare their gains in 2001 with 1997. In 97 and 98, the twin fears of East Indians came alive. GIFT, then ROAR were born. Business people got frustrated with the PNC's old style. Decent middle class Guyanese were against the street violence after the 97 poll. As a result of these occurrences, the PNC lost two important publicity voices in Nascimento and Tony Veira. Then came the PSU strike in 99, the PNC's character got daubed with mud inside and outside of Guyana. Then in 2001, the PNC rebound despite these stigmas. It increased its percentage in 2001(its traditional enemy the PPP has its decreased). The PNC in 2001 got multi-racial vote in the vicinity of 4%. No doubt in 2001 if the PNC had its quota of intellectual spin-doctors and if early in the campaign it had turned back from impassable road its was travelling on, its showing in the last elections could have improved making for a minority PPP government. Five years is just around the corner, let's hope people learn from the mistakes of the past. If not, there may not be a future for them.