Federalism:
A Framework for Dealing with Ethnic Conflict in Guyana
By Ravi Dev
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 Indianness Under Siege
By Anand Sawant Mulloo

March 22, 2008: This paper is meant to outline the evolution of the Indian diaspora, loaded as it is with historical, sociological and psychological complexes that render it so fascinating and so challenging as it undergoes dynamic changes under pressure from contrary local and international influences.

Policy of Assimilation. It was under the French governor, Mahe de Labourdonnais, around 1735, that the first batch of Indian Immigrants, then called esclaves a talents or skilled slaves, were brought from Pondicherry, then a French station, into Mauritius, called Ile de France, under the administration of the French East india Company, to build the port and urban infrastructure of Port Louis. Since they were mostly males and were mixed with the African slaves they had no alternative but to inter-marry African women and they gave birth to subsequent generations of Creoles- of mixed African and Indian origins. As slaves, they did not enjoy any individual freedom whatsoever, including cultural or religious. And as had happened to all African slaves throughout the colonies, they were Christianised, particularly under the powerful Roman Catholic Church. This was to mark the future history of multi-racial Mauritius dominated by French culture and European civilization and which pursued the policy of assimilation, otherwise absorbing them into French culture and wiping out their ancestral culture. The result was that the Creoles learnt to emulate the white who kept them at a social distance while they imbibed the white racial prejudice against Indian and African traditions.
Since the Creole descendants were cut off completely from their ancestral homelands, they had to live and share the same conditions in the colony. In course of time the descendants of Indians lost their Indian identity and became Creolised in the process of adaptation to the new social reality under the demanding French masters. They lost touch with their ancestral values and began to adopt a hybrid French culture and manners while maintaining Indian cuisine, some surviving Indian habits in their folklore. In other words, they lost their Indianness, the Indian brand of culture, language, civilization, pride in Indian history and in Mother India.
Most of the Creole women who worked as domestic servants in the French houses began to assimilate some of the French habits and manners which were held up as European and therefore as superior, like the drinking habit and the lavish living which would land them into adapting the pleasure-seeking and spending habit. Naturally enough, they discarded the more rigorous Indian customs which they thought did not adapt to their Euro-centric, easy-going social and cultural environment. Alongside these manners, they absorbed the racial and colour prejudices of their masters which denigrated the Black and Brown races as primitives. This meant that whatever came from the West was deemed necessarily superior and what came from Africa and India was inevitably inferior. From the beginning, the Catholic Church has had its share of blame in propagating the anti-Hinduism virus in its eagerness to proselytize the Hindus and it ended up spreading a general anti-Hindu hatred in the colony. Thus, the Creoles were made to believe that they were heirs to European culture and were consequently vastly superior to the pagan Hindus. From this time onward, many of the Creoles developed the anti-Indian complex which was based on the anti-Hindu prejudice they picked from their priests and their white masters who played the dirty politics of divide-and-rule. .
Now, this process of Creolisation arising from the mixture of Black and Brown races, took place mostly in the urban areas affecting pockets of Indians stranded from the bulk of their rural and agrarian stock. The erosion of Indianness and the spreading of Creolisation became a permanent feature in all the colonies- in the Indian Ocean, or Mauritius, Reunion, Rodrigues, or in the Caribbean countries, in Jamaica, Trinidad, Tobago, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyana. It has continued unabated even into our own time with the spread of westernization, tbe US-funded evangelization campaigns, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and other political and international forces.
The old Indian diaspora. In contrast, a century later, with the abolition of slavery, in 1834, the first batch of Indentured Indian Immigrants, mainly from the hilly areas of Bihar, was introduced into the Crown colony of Mauritius on a trial basis. Unlike the French, British colonization adopted a more liberal approach to religious freedom to the Indians. They ruled the colony with the partnership of the big French planters, just as they did in India with the partnership of kings. Later, this was followed by successive arrivals of shiploads of other Indian Immigrants, known as the old diaspora, sourced from inside the villages of Bihar, Madras, Andhra and Bombay provinces. On landing at the Immigration depot, now Apravashi Ghats, they were distributed to different plantations where they could live together as close-knit communities and were able to retain their distinct cultural, linguistic, religious and civilizational identity.
After the successful adaptation of the Indentured labourers to the plantation labour in Mauritius, the Indenture system was extended to the other plantation colonies of South Africa, the Caribbean and in Fiji. Taking over from the slaves and working under White masters who were still impregnated with the slave masters' mentality, the Indians had to face harsh conditions in the plantations. The colonial laws smacked of slavery and were extremely oppressive, including abuse and violence. Wages were kept extremely low, aggravated by the obnoxious double cut system on every single day's of absence. They were granted poor quality food ration of rice,. dhall, oil and salt. Undaunted, the Indians could pull through as they were traditionally used to simple living and hard-working, believing in the virtue of self-sacrifice and performing good karma. The ambition of the indentured labourers was to save the maximum possible within the shortest possible time in order to free themselves from the grips of the estate camps and set up life as free labourers and small planters on their own in a village, at the expiry of the Indenture contract. This is why they worked day and night and got engaged in a variety of occupations to maximize their income by growing vegetable, keeping cows, goats, poultry and doing a variety of craft jobs for sale in the local market.
If they had been able to put up with the hardship, it was due to the resourcefulness of Indianness which was rooted in the preservation of their family and social structure, the strength of their ancestral values, their close-knit community living which ensured solid social control and maintained law and order, kept the creeping social evils of divorces, domestic violence, delinquency, criminality at bay. However, it was their very doggedness to stick to the values of Indianness that rescued them from self-degradation. This was made up of a package of ethical-moral and spiritual values which pulled them together and invigorated their individual and collective strength. It comprised of a rare combination of winning qualities, including a sense of self-discipline, of personal endurance, a fighting spirit- both physical and moral. They were respected for their proverbial patience, their tolerance, their honesty, their work ethics, their adherence to the values of peace, non-violence and truth, their spirit of fraternity and their willingness to help one another to share the social burden and face the white oppressors.
Contrary to what had happened earlier to the Indian slaves who had given up their Indianness too easily though under duress as they were forced to embrace French culture and Catholicism, the Indian villagers had no desire to emulate their white masters. They preferred to live peacefully in the sugar estates while cherishing the values of Indian culture, civilization and religion which gave a meaning and purpose to their lives. Yet they kept open the option of incorporating certain specific aspects of European culture at their own free will without giving up on their essential Indianness.
In the nineteenth century, the Indian Immigrants stuck doggedly to their ancestral way of living. They wore the same simple dress, the same headgears, lived in similar straw huts which they constructed themselves, sat on mats, fetched grass and firewood from the nearby wasteland or forests, drew water from the wells, washed their clothes in the nearby river or streams, baked the roti on the tawa, cooked the steaming rice, dhall, curry and vegetable culled from the kitchen garden, grinding their cereals, pounding their spices on the stone in the Indian tradition. The children played the same traditional games and spoke the same Bhojpuri or other Indian languages as were current in their ancestral villages. Around their habitations, they would plant mango, banana, pipal trees, betel and leafy vegetable creepers, some ayurvedic plants like the tulsi, the ayapana. They would keep cows, goats or poultry for milk and food and would sell the produce for profits. Their mode of transportation was the simple ox-carts just as it was in their ancestral villages and they preserved some of their ancestral occupations as gardeners, carpenters, builders, tinsmiths, tailors, hairdressers, cowkeepers, carters, milk sellers, money lenders, small manufacturers and traders.
Village Soliarity. They used to meet in the village shrine, temple, kovil, or mosque, where they would chant chowpai from the Ramayana and draw sustenance from the exile, the trials and tribulations of Ram and Sita, assisted by Hanumn, the monkey God whom they visualized as flying on the hill tops and hovering over the fields for their protection.They used to plant a Hanuman "jhandha" in their yard overlooking their simple shrine where they would offer daily worship. They joined together in a spirit of solidarity in the performance of the elaborate birth, death ceremonies, particularly the colourful Hindu weddings, complete with the rituals, the songs, dances, open house reception, involving the voluntary community solidairty in the organization of the different phases of the weddings. By way of rituals and entertertainment, they continued to celebrate the same festivals of holy, Divali, Dasera, Taipussum, Eid in a sober manner. From time to time, they organized drama and dance performances from the Ramayana and held regular soul-stirring bhajan sessions to add colour and gaity to their hum-drum lives.
More important still, they cherished the Indian ethical values of family life, of strict monogamy, caring for their children and for the elderly, the respect of the master and of authority and the reverence of nature and of their deity. These ancestral values made for peaceful living and social harmony- vital in a multi-racial society. In other words, these simple Hindu folks laid the foundation of independence and of democratic living based on the principles of mutual co-operation, tolerance, understanding and respecting the rights of others. This is no doubt, in a wider context, a reflection on the success of India as the world's largest democracy in contrast to the neighbouring Islamic countries, home to fundamentalism, intolerence, authoritarianism and chronic violence.
Gradually, the Indians began to drop some of the more oppressive features of the Indian traditions - of dowry, early marriage, caste rigidity while the practice of widow burning or suttee never took place in the colonies.
It was distinctly a "them and us" cultural confrontation between the Indians who generally bonded together under one common cultural identity, speaking the common Bhojpuri, as against the arrogant French-speaking oppressors, and their allies the Coloured. Under this dormant racial antagonism, the Indians needed the White as much as the latter needed the Indians to oil the sugar industry and the island's economy. Functioning in a capitalist economy, where private enterprise and risk-taking are the economic pillars, the white Oligarchy valued the entrepreneurial spirit of the Indians, their hard work and self-sacrifices. Indirectly, they used the Indians as their economic levers in the process of the centralization of the sugar industry when they parcelled out their old sugar estates to the small Indian planters. Slowly, from this class of small planters there arose the future independent middle class Indians, whose descendants would emerge as professionals, businessmen, traders and rulers of this country and ready to spread their wings across other western countries.
But with the dawn of the twentieth century, with the arrival of Mahatma Gandhi ( November 1901), followed by Manilal Doctor (1907-11), and the frequent visits of Indian religious leaders and reformers, Indians in Mauritius began to take cognition of their distinct Indianness. The message was invariably less on Bhakti Yoga and increasingly more on Karma Yoga as advocated by Lord Krishna. The new interpretation of Karma Yoga was examplified by the lives and teachings of foremost Karma Yogis, namely Swami Dayanand, Swami Vivekanand, Lokmanya Tilak, Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Mahatma Gandhi. They all taught that one should elevate oneself by one's own efforts and one should not act for one's selfish interests alone but for the welfare of others in a spirit of duty and sacrifice.
Swami Dayanand (1824-83). Inspired by the lesson of the First War of Indian Independence and the awakening of the spirit of Indian nationalism in 1857, Swami Dayanand founded the Arya Samaj in 1875. He initiated new intellectual and rational traditions, different from the emotional and non-intellectual Bhakti traditions which only induced a spirit of docility and blind acceptance of authority. He used public debates and a critical and rational spirit to denounce the false teachings and superstitions. His followers, both in India and abroad, adopted his critical and argumentative traditions. He validated his teachings by referring to the Vedas as the source book of Hindu scriptures. He urged the Hindus to go back to the basics as taught in the Vedas with its focus on the search for truth and rationality against the prevailing ignorance and superstitions. He laid stress on the value of social reforms, of the emancipation of women, the remarriage of widows and the granting of equal status to women in society. Author of ten books, he stressed on the primacy of acquiring education, the need to make personal efforts for self-improvement. Consequently, the DAV College was founded in Lahore and a large number of schools were founded giving way to a vigorous intellectual movement which spread across India and abroad. A stalwart and fearless yogi, he highlighted the importance of the full development of the body-mind- and spirit. By rejecting untouchability and the caste system which he associated with traditional priestly domination, he championed the Dalit cause. He used Hindi as the medium of unification. In other words, he contributed immensely to the emergence of modern independent India. His message went directly into the heart and mind of the downtrodden Hindu who felt called upon to rise on his feet and claim his dignity, his honour and civic rights and do his share to throw out foreign domination. ( Satish Chandra, 6 August 2004).
Consequently, an army of dedicated Arya Samaj missionaries and reformers, led by Pandit Cassinath Kistoe, scoured the towns and villages of this island to propagate the Vedic message and set up branches of the Samaj. The result was that it re-invigorated Indian society physically, socially and mentally and inaugurated a new era of reforms and of modernity based on the acceptance of truth and rationality and the rejection of superstitions. It triggered a vigorous intellectual and educational movement and a nascent Hindu nationalism and a tremendous interest in social emancipation that paved the way for the struggle for independence and the democratic tradition.
The emergence of Indian nationalism, championed by Mahatma Gandhi and represented intellectually by Rabindranath Tagore and the western-educated Jawaharlal Nehru awakened their sense of dignity, honour and self-respect. It fuelled their spirit of Indian patriotism and identity destined to culminate in the long-term struggle for political freedom from foreign rule under the leadership of the Mauritius Labour Party, headed by Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam.
Chacha Ramgoolam (1900-85) stands as a bridge between the East and the West, the past and the present. As the son of an Indentured Immigrant and the brother of a small planter, living in the remote village of Belle Rive, Ramgoolam was destined to emerge as the future leader of this country, the man who brought it to independence and who endowed it with a solid, democratic constitution. Having studied in London as a doctor, he fell under the spell of the Fabian Society and the British Labour Party where he mastered the fine art of British politics and adopted the value of freedom, democracy and human rights. Rooted in the village of Belle Rive in the district of Flacq, Ramgoolam never forgot his humble rural origins as he kept in permanent touch with the villagers throughout his exceptionally long political career, 1935-85.
After leaving the prestigious Royal College in Curepipe, Mauritius, for London, he must have undergone a sea change during his fifteen years stay in the British capital, then the intellectual and political platform of the universe. There, he saw himself caught in the stormy struggle for Indian independence as he joined and headed the local branch of the Indian National Congress and mixed up with Indian nationalist students then militating for the freedom of India under the glare of the Scotland Yard. While retaining all the characteristics of Indianness as the the son of an Immigrant, he remained loyal to the values of Indian culture based on peace, non-violence, tolerance, hard-work, humility, respect of elders, of women and of the common people. He skilfully blended these Eastern values with the British intellectual values, particularly its gentlemanly culture, its British dress code, a strong love of reading and of permanent learning, its scientific and rational thinking, its technology, its modernity, its sense of justice and fair play, its political pragmatism, its diplomatic finesse and its philosophy of gradual change- all of which put him far ahead of his Mauritian contemporaries. .
Perhaps from among the vast array of contributions of SSR to this country, we may single out his adherence to democratic values which he securely embedded on the Mauritian soil as his lasting legacy. Thanks to his long stay in power as the Premier, the Chief Minister and the Prime Minister of Mauritius from 1957 to 1982, he was able to endow the country with a liberal, democratic constitution which guarantees the two party system, majority rule, the fundamental freedoms and liberties of the individual, human rights, the rule of law, the guarantee of minority rights, religious freedom, an impartial judiciary, the separation of powers between the Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary, an independent police, independent Public Service Commission and other rights. These have stood the test of time and democracy is firmly entrenched since 1968, the year of independence.
As the modernization process gathered speed under Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, the Mauritian villages were being transformed out of recognition from the backwaters they were under the former White oligarchy and British colonization. Suddenly, in the wake of new prosperity and national planning, the straw huts made way for lovely bungalows, equipped with modern amenities, including running tap water, electricity, green lawns, good road and transport infrastructure, telephone, children's playgrounds and sports fields, shopping areas, schools, dispensaries, markets. But the underlying spirit of Indianness which had constituted the essence of the villages had remained as the undying theme except that it had been upgraded with a touch of modernity. Similarly, cars and buses have replaced the ox-carts. Modern fashions, electronic devices, the bharat nattyam dances and pop music, the internet and telecommunications manned by professionals have replaced the earlier days of amateurism and folklore.
It must be added that Indians, particularly the professionals, who have migrated into certain democratic Western countries feel secure in the exercise of their rights. As a matter of fact, many of them feel happier and more prosperous than in their own homeland where they are victims to political manipulation, hampered by the allocation of reserved seats enforced by law for the benefit of certain specific minorities, so that meritocracy is often sacrificed for mediocrity.
Indians Under Fire. Mauritius is among the rare former British colonies which has witnessed the proper working of democracy, the establishment of peace and social harmony, the Rule of Law and the guranteed rights of its citizens. It contrasts sharply with other former British colonies, including Guyana where Dr Chady Jagan, its first prime minister, was ousted from power to make way for Burnham who ruled with an iron fist and resorted to dictatorship and State terrorism to impose Black minority rule on the Asian majority. In Fiji, the rights of the Indians have been foiled on more than two occasions when the elected Indian Prime Minister had been ousted from power by military coup.
In Malaysia, the situation facing the 2.3 million minority Indians amidst 60% Moslem Malays is really precarious as the constitution does not guarantee minority rights, and religious freedom. The BN Coalition government, in power since independence in 1957, rules like an autocratic regime with the semblance of democracy as it wields absolute power over Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary and over the media. The Opposition and the people do not enjoy any freedom of protest as the oppressive Internal Security Act is clamped down on the least display of public demonstration or opposition and the leaders are simply arrested and jailed without being proved guilty in a court of law. Religious freedom does not exist as the government proceeds from time to time with the demolition of Hindu shrines and temples in a bid to force them to embrace Islam. The civil service, the police, the government institutions and even private business companies are packed with Malays to the exclusion of the more meritorious Indians and Chinese.
In Pakistan, in 1948, after Partition, 15% of the population who were Hindus, the original inhabitants of the country, had preferred to stay behind on their ancestral property. But under the authoritarian Islamic Republic of Pakistan they were under pressure to convert with the result that today only 1 % of the population are Hindus. So, when you look around at the fate of the minority Hindus in the Islamic or Moslem-dominated countries, you come across the same dismal picture of anti-Hindu oppression and the marked absence of democracy, minority rights, religious freedom or the rule of law.
The creation of Pakistan has had negative repercussions on the Moslem population of Mauritius, who, despite being of Indian origins, tended to identify themselves with the anti-Indian posture of Pakistan. As a matter of fact, in the crucial 1967 elections the vast majority joined the PMSD in its divide-and-rule policy, dictated by the Franco-Mauritians, to oppose independence. The same thing happened with a section of the Tamil population of Mauritius who joined the PMSD under the banner of Tamil United Party under the false slogan that "Tamils are not Hindus". The consequence was that the Indo-Mauritian majority was whittled down and the PMSD scored 44% votes in the elections. After the decline of the PMSD in the 1970, the rising MMM opposition was to harvest the PMSD"s anti-Hindu electoral support.
But the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the 1970's in the wake of Ayatoola Khomeini in Iran and its spread across the world, aggravated by the Middle East crisis and the rise of the oil-rich Gulf countries have had the effect of driving a wedge between a majority of the Mauritian Moslems from their Indianness. The geo-political and ideological situation is further complicated by the geographical nearness of the Gulf countries, helped by the ease of travels and of telecommunications, the annual contingent to the Hajj pilgrimage, the effects of mass media and the inflow of oil funds- all put together- have produced a new Arabisation trend among the majority of the local Moslems. This can be seen in their assumption of a new Arab identity which is rendered visible in their wearing long beards and Islamic dress, the long white robes, and the veils..
Despite the above anti-Indianness trend, secular India has pursued an open, all-inclusive policy which provides security and equal opportunities to all its citizens, Hindus, Moslems and Christians alike. At the same time, it reflects on the liberality, democracy, tolerance and magnanimity of the Hindus. It emphasizes the permanent characteristic of the maturity of their character, culture, civilization and religion. It should be remembered that India, the world's largest democracy, is home to 140 million Muslims who enjoy super-privileges as a minority amidst a population made up of 80% tolerant Hindus. Obviously, during a millennium of Moghul rule, Hindus were persecuted with the "Hindu Tax" which forced many of them to embrace Islam to escape payment.
However, the Indian Moslems, mostly of Hindu origins, sharing the same culture, language, entertainment and environment, enjoy equal access to all the facilities available in India. As a result, they are far better off than their counter-parts in authoritarian Pakistan plagued with serial military dictatorships, instability, chronic terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, poverty and backwardness. Secular India accomodates all its citizens who have generally refrained from engaging in anti-India terrorist activities. This is despite the fact that since the time of President General Zial-ul-Hak, Pakistan has been pursuing an aggressive proxy war on India, exporting terrorists, training camps, instructors and weapons into Jammu-Kashmir and deep inside India, targeting its economic symbols and mass transportation system as well as the Indian Parliament. Briefly, it can be said that India has managed to keep its Moslem population happy and contented so that they have refrained from joining the camp of Islamic terrorists in Pakistan, Afghanistan or in the Middle East. This shows the triumph of Indianness which is rooted in democratic principle, in freedom of opinion, in tolerance and peaceful and non-violent living, dating back to the Vedic and Buddhist period. The effects of India's inclusive secularism have ensured that the Indian diaspora are spared from the instability and insecurity sparked by imported fundamentalist terrorism.
Finally, when we compare the figures of the percentage of Hindus in Mauritiu over the past four decades since independence, we are startled at the rapid decline of its demography. This is explained by the fact of the large erosion caused by the intense US-funded evangelization campaign which has gained every single street and nook and corner of the island with their numerous houses of God and Christian sects vying with one another to convert the Hindus. Independent Mauritius finds itself plunged back into the conditions of Ile de France under the French East India Company when the skilled Indian slaves were forced to convert and Creolise. History is now repeating itself, It won't be long before the Hindu majority- as is also happening very rapidly in the Caribbean countries- will be depleted into a minority and exposed to oppression under an intolerant majority. This why we have to watch out and safeguard our precious heritage of Indianness, a gift to the world.
Editor's Note: Anand Sawant Mulloo is author of Voices of the Indian Diaspora
Email: anandmulloo@intnet.mu
Website: www.writeranandmulloo.com


Presented at Conference on Democratization and Conflict Resolution, University of Guyana, February 4-6th 2004

"The essence of Federalism is not to be found in a particular set of institutions but in the institutionalisation of particular relationships among the participants of political life."

Modern Guyanese political history is characterised by bouts of intense conflict between the two major ethnic groups in Guyana ­ Indians and Africans. There have been several explanations proffered for the enduring conflict, including the cleavages in the society stemming from cultural and class differences; unequal power-resources (political, social, economic) in those different groups; an inappropriate political system; power-drunk leaders, racist views of other groups, political ideologies that stress armed struggle, etc. Unfortunately, for the majority of Guyanese the explanation comes down to bad people ­ especially "bad people" from the other ethnic group, creating mayhem.
It is even more unfortunate that of recent, even some academics have joined the chorus of blaming individuals and particular groups for the violence. These academics do this somewhat more sophisticatedly by imputing mindsets on these individuals and groups, such as racism and casteism, without taking due care to uncover and delineate structures that would have structured such mindsets. This amounts to proposing that the only way to eliminate the violence would be to eliminate the bad people. This is nihilistic and such approaches must be condemned. If nothing else studies from the social studies must grapple with the social construction of reality and actions and therefore hold out the possibility of social change.
After, inter alia, examining the specific instances of ethnic violence and the several purported causes, this paper concludes that there are no mono-causal explanations for the enduring conflict and that additionally, one has to distinguish between proximate and systemic factors. Even the systemic factors operate at different levels. The political elites have defined their goals for Guyana in terms of the achievements of the developed Western nations ­ especially Britain, which was the governing colonial power for most of Guyana's history. One of the deeper systemic factors precipitating the proximate causes stems from the politicians' attempts to reach an end-state in Guyana that their erstwhile models achieved only after undergoing, sequentially over many centuries, three massive macro-societal revolutions - centred on national identity, political participation and economic distribution.
Attempts to conflate these three revolutions, which sought to expand the equitable distribution of power in the model societies, and achieve them simultaneously, have engendered severe contradictions in Guyana ­ leading eventually, in some instances, to ethnic conflict. These contradictions are almost inevitable since institutional innovations sought to be introduced in one area may require institutional precursors in other areas. Sequencing of institutional changes becomes critical because of this dynamic interaction. In Guyana, the "cultural question" implicit in 'national identity" has been put on the back burner even though culture ­ narrowly defined as the value system of the people ­ provides the contexts for the success or failure of all institutions. Institutions cannot be imposed on societies that violate entrenched values and if stipulated formally, will only be observed in the breach and be ineffective or dysfunctional. Inappropriate institutions are the prime systemic causes of political tension and violence in Guyana.
The paper will be divided into the three broad areas of national identity, political participation and economic distribution that have structured our national endeavour to distribute power as equitably as possible. Within each area, contradictions will be identified and their institutional frameworks analysed from the their origin in the developed countries and their application in Guyana. Institutional changes, more in consonance with local realities will be introduced. The concept of Federalism will then be introduced as an overarching framework to integrate the proposals into a internally consistent paradigm.
The paper will therefore begin with the "national question" by analysing British society in the development of the "nation-state" ideal that has served as the model for Guyana. It contrasts Britain of the early twentieth century, where by and large most individuals saw themselves as "British" following centuries of homogenising efforts, with Guyana ­ celebrated as the "land of six peoples". It concludes that Guyanese society can best be characterised as a reticulated stratified ethnically plural society.
In Guyana, however, the politicians of the modern era felt that the question of national identity had more or less been settled a la Britain, the "motherland". The national motto adopted after Independence - "One People, One Nation, One Destiny"- assumed that everyone would assimilate into "Creole" culture, which was defined as "Guyanese" culture. This assumption led to two contradictions in the society. Firstly, the cultural values of Creole culture and those retained by later arrivals from their original cultures may sometimes contradict institutional demands vis a vis present national goals. Secondly, groups arriving after the abolition of slavery contested this assumption as oppressive, and were later resentful that they were excluded from the composition of the national culture. This created strains between the later-arriving groups and those that defended the status quo, which played a part in precipitating extreme ethnic behaviour. The concept of a multicultural state and Multiculturalism as the approach to the "national" culture will be introduced to address these strains.
The paper will demonstrate that the various ethnic groups are differentially incorporated into the power relations of the society. This differential incorporation has driven the political competition as each group struggles within the rules of the political system, to take the reins of power, which most see as a prerequisite for economic security, and also as an end in itself. It is not apparent to most that there culture is also a reservoir of power.
The paper looks at the political system under-girding the Westminster majoritarian form of democracy developed, practiced and then promulgated by Britain in the colonies. It was based on the political philosophy of Liberalism, with institutions developed over the centuries for British circumstances. These were decreed as appropriate for Guyana, even though the societies were quite different. The Westminster system assumes that enough individuals vote for parties based on their stance on particular issues to produce a pool of 'swing votes". This pool increases the probability that governments will be changed on a fairly regular basis since it is highly unlikely that any one party will have the answers to all new exigencies year after year.
However in severely divided plural societies such as Guyana, voting is not done on the basis of issues, but almost invariably on the basis of ethnicity, personified by the identity of the leadership of the particular party. The application of the Westminster majoritarian system in Guyana produces dilemmas for the several competing groups, in a dynamic and self reinforcing fashion, in that if they play by the rules of engagement, they cannot assume office or if they do cannot exercise power effectively. In Guyana, where the Indian majority can vote as a bloc, the minority African/Coloured bloc can be locked out of Executive office in perpetuity, since it cannot form a majority even in coalition with other ethnic groups such as Amerindians. In Guyana, this is the Ethnic Security Dilemma of the African Guyanese.
When as in Guyana, the minority approaches the size of the majority (at its highest numerical advantage Indians were fifty-one percent of the population as opposed to the forty-two percent of Africans/Mixed bloc) it is very unlikely that that minority will automatically grant legitimacy to the government of the majority ad infinitum. They have no incentive to go along with the rules of political competition. There will be inevitable demands for a greater share in the decision-making processes, especially if such minorities have resources at their disposal to challenge the rule of the majority. Within those rules, politics is viewed as a zero-sum game ­ especially by the major protagonists and encourage extreme political behaviour, including violence. In Guyana, the African minority, given confidence through their domination of the state institutions, especially the Police, Army and Civil Service, have challenged the Indian majority's physical security. If Indians play by the political rules, they can accede to office but cannot govern because of the threats to their physical security. A "Mexican Standoff" has been created. This is the Indian Ethnic Security Dilemma. The Ethnic Security Dilemmas are addressed through a menu of measures that includes structural aspects of federalism and a Government of National Reconciliation.
Another consequence of inappropriate political arrangements that contribute to political violence is a centralised governmental structure that has stubbornly resisted reformation efforts. This centralised rule came out of the colonial era where administrative efficiency for extraction of resources was the watchword. The contribution of the centralised governmental and administrative style and structures that lend themselves to authoritarianism governance, on the precipitation of ethnic violence will be examined. The non-centralised governance approach of Federalism will address these contradictions.
In the modern world, the goal of political life is seen as leading to increased standards of living. The economic improvements are expected to be equitably distributed amongst the people, which in the Western models, had been achieved after long and intense struggle and tinkering of institutional arrangements. Since this was the last "revolution' achieved by the West (and is still in motion) economic equity is very much on the minds of the local politicians. In fact it was on the question of economic injustice that most of the anti-colonial struggle was waged and led to many politicians, including the major ones from Guyana, to adopt "radical" ideologies such as Marxism, which promised economic equity.
It is also on the economic question that many of the contradictions of inappropriate imported institutional have surfaced. With the increased compilation and circulation of economic statistics, it becomes apparent very quickly when economic development is not equitably distributed, and by what manner that has been done. In Guyana, during the PNC regime, Indians could point to such statistics to buttress their claims of being discriminated against. That, more than anything, fuelled their resentment against the PNC and led to heightened tensions from their perspective. With the installation of the PPP/C from 1992, there has been just as persistent cries from the African Guyanese segment that they are not receiving an equitable share of the economic pie. While, the figures do show that there is no correlation between ethnicity and economic standing (with the notable exception of the Amerindians) it has confirmed that there is ethnic dominance in various sectors. The government's policies in these sectors are rigorously scrutinised for possible ethnic discrimination. These charges of "racism", 'discrimination", "marginalisation" and "ethnic cleansing" have, more than any other proximate factor, contributed to the present increased levels of tensions. The economic tensions are addressed by ethnic Impact Statement for all Government programs and policies, ethnic economic participation goals, and affirmative action for disadvantaged groups.
Ethnic conflict is not unique to Guyana; in fact it has become the most prevalent form of conflict within States all across the globe in recent years. The approaches towards ameliorating such conflicts are all imbued with the principle that power, in all its forms, must be shared more equitably amongst the groups, as they identify themselves, in the various societies. There are two broad approaches ­ Consociationalism and Integrative Federalism - that have been utilised to address such conflicts. This paper does not consider the two approaches as mutually exclusive and the writer has previously proposed elements from each (in addition to some others) as a "menu of measures" to address the political problems of Guyana. These measures can be grouped within the three broad areas of national life that are reservoirs of power, and which have been contested as being unjustly distributed. The measures, mentioned in context above, include multiculturalism (national culture); Government of National Reconciliation, Federal Republic, Disciplined Forces reflecting population of the states (political justice) and Economic participation goals, Ethnic Impact Statement, Affirmative Action and local/state control of economic development (economic justice).
The paper examines the concept of Federalism from three perspectives: a) sociological/normative; b) formal/institutional and c) procedural/process/bargaining. The perspectives are utilised to develop Federalism as a framework for bringing together the proposed specific institutional changes and measures, in a coherent paradigm to address Guyana's ethnic conflict.
The paper does not see federalism as any kind of 'silver bullet" for curing all the ailments of our political system. However it does assert that federalism provides a macro-environment that facilitates the lessening of ethnic conflict in Guyana while simultaneously offering citizens a principled philosophy of action, rooted in justice.

Part 1
ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN GUYANA
While there have been sporadic incidents of violence between Indians and Africans from the commencement of the former group's insertion into Guyana, these incidents were spontaneous, isolated and based on local, sometimes, personal issues. Organised and widespread overt acts of hostility first appeared in the months preceding the 1961 General Elections, which was marked by a high level of tension between Africans and Indians. Supporters of the PNC, took the exhortation of their party to "sweep out the PPP" literally, and used their party's symbol ­ the broom ­ to sweep at passing Indians, while the latter flaunted their symbol and dragged the broom in the streets. There were any number of minor scuffles and confrontations countrywide, many reported in the press. Eusi Kwayana, in his booklet, Next Witness, claims that an African supporter of the PNC, Felix Ross of Rose Hall, Berbice was murdered for political reasons on the night of the elections and that this was the beginning of the "disturbances" that was to characterise the sixties. This writer went through the newspapers of the time and interviewed contemporaries of Ross, but was unable to discover any corroboration of Mr. Kwayana's claim. Local residents and the Police saw the murder, as a purely private matter.
What is incontrovertible, however, is that while there had been rising concerns about the ascendant Indian profile in Guyana, the polarisation between the two major ethnic groups became entrenched during the political mobilisation of 1961. The group boundaries themselves became more pronounced. Some see ethnicity and ethnic consciousness as consequences of political mobilisation but in Guyana we see that the nexus between ethnicity and political mobilisation is a dynamic one and the descent into ethnic violence is quite contextual.
On what became known as Black Friday, February 16th 1962, large sections of Georgetown's commercial section with Indian businesses, was burnt down. In 1963, widespread countrywide violence erupted during an eighty-day strike called by the Civil Service Union. The violence took an ethnic orientation as Indians supported the PPP Government and Africans supported the strikers during civil disobedience "sit-ins" in front of Government buildings. In 1964, the Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union ­ the sugar workers union supported by the PPP - called a strike, ostensibly to gain recognition by the Sugar Producers' Association as the official bargaining agent for sugar workers and precipitated the most intense inter-ethnic violence in the history of Guyana - one hundred and seventy-six individuals were killed, thousands were injured and hundreds of homes were torched. Thousands abandoned their homes and jobs and Guyana ethnic segregation deepened as individuals resettled in ethnically homogenous communities. A PNC-UF coalition replaced the PPP in December 1964.
While we now have confirmation that the U.S. and Britain backed the destabilisation of the PPP regime because of their fears of the PPP establishing a pro-Soviet satellite in Guyana (a not unfounded fear, we now also know) this is a proximate cause since we have shown that the seeds of hostility were already set in 1961 when there was no direct foreign intervention. The violence of the sixties demonstrated that both parties had cadres who were highly trained militarily. This tradition was evidently carefully maintained since.
The period 1964-1992 was characterised by an authoritarian regime of the PNC, especially after the PNC jettisoned its UF junior partner and ensconced itself in office by routinely rigging elections. Its illegal rule was secured by military personnel that by 1976 had reached the staggering ratio of one armed personnel to every thirty-five civilians. During the period, private goon-squads that supported the PNC, wrecked havoc on the civilian population ­ especially on Indians. By mid-1985, anti-Indian depredations had reached such staggering proportions that one political activist, Eusi Kwayana, wrote that "it had a flavour of genocide".
The House of Israel ­ a PNC backed group that was armed by the party, formed the core of what was graphically described as "kick-down-the-door" bandits. The Working Peoples' Alliance, which had presented the most effective opposition to the PNC during the seventies, was also selected for violence and murder. Walter Rodney, one of its leaders and several activists were assassinated by Government forces.
A combination of domestic and diaspora agitation and most importantly the fall of the Soviet empire, persuaded the U.S, to broker the return of "free and fair" elections on October 5th 1992. After it became apparent that the PNC had lost the elections, anti Indian violence broke out in Georgetown and was only quelled when outgoing President Desmond Hoyte ordered troops in the streets and gave the order to use deadly force, if necessary.
On January 12th 1998, following PNC marches in Georgetown that protested the PPP's victory at the December 1997 elections, anti-Indian violence on a massive scale broke out in Georgetown. This ethnically-directed violence spread and continued sporadically in ever widening circles around the East Coast of Demerara to 2002. In that year matters escalated following the Republic Day (February 23rd.) prison breakout by five notorious criminals. The bandits formed the core of a gang of criminals operating with impunity out of the African village of Buxton that created even greater mayhem, murder, robberies and rapes against Indians in adjoining villages. The gang claimed that they were protecting African interests and the violence was once again ethnically directed against Indians.
Confronted by a special police unit, the Tactical Services Unit ­ the "Black Clothes", (formed by the Hoyte PNC government) which the Government had increasingly relied on to deal with high intensity crime ­ sometimes with questionable legality - this gang engaged and decimated the Unit. Following this development several "Death Squads" appeared on the scene and went after the bandits, apparently with both private and official connivance. An orgy of violence followed in which mostly young African men were executed ­ many with criminal records. It was asserted that drug interests were also deeply involved.
There has been a persistent debate as to whether the violence in Guyana is actually politically rather than ethnically directed. As we pointed out earlier, there is a dynamic relationship between the actors in the conflict and the rationales for their actions. It is man who gives meaning to his actions. It is our contention that while there are feelings of hostility or antagonism immanent in segments within every group in Guyana, against other groups, it is not the hostility per se, that propels the violence but rather the drive to protect interests that are perceived to be threatened by others.
If the violence was meant to subjugate other groups it would have been correct to label it "racist" since the groups are racially differentiated, but this is not the case. However to the individuals affected by the violence the distinction, akin to that in law between "intent" and "motive", is irrelevant as they seek to secure justice against individuals ­ who invariably are from different ethnic groups. Some politicians will seize upon this ambiguity if it can garner support in the particular political system. The distinction, however, can be useful for policymakers since it suggests that programs to defuse the violence must focus on securing justice in the distribution of resources between ethnic groups while other programs may deal with "stereotypes" and other groups' perception of each other.
There have been widespread accusations during the PPP regimes that their actions were (1957-1964) and are (1992-present) racist against Africans. Similar accusations have been made against the PNC that they were racist (1964-1992) against Indians. If the activities of any individual, organisation or group falls differentially on citizens who have some distinctive characteristic in common, it ought not to be of any surprise that they will enquire whether they are any connections between the action and the characteristic. With reference to the distinctions made above, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that if there is an adverse impact on any specified group that that is statistically anomalous for their percentage in the target population, then without the need to prove intent, a rebuttable presumption of "discrimination/racism" can be inferred. Analogously, when as in present-day Guyana crimes statistical anomalies highlight that an overwhelmingly large majority of the victims of crime are Indians; the overwhelming majority of the perpetrators of the crimes are Africans and the overwhelming majority of victims of police killings are Africans, it is up to the authorities to rebut the reasonable presumption in the minds of the populace that "race" is involved as a motive in the actions. Scholars and politicians also, should seek to demonstrate beyond mere assertion whether "correlation" is equal to "causation".

NATIONAL CULTURE AND IDENTITY

The Proffered Paradigm:
The Unitary nation-state

The concept of the "nation-state" has become such a ubiquitous international norm, that it is difficult for us to realize that the modern state was only born in 1648 at the Treaty of Westphalia and that the extension of the idea to the reality of the "nation state" took root in the nineteen century. From its European feudal origins where kings had to scrounge their lords to raise armies, the State became omnipotent and omnipresent as the monarchy centralized power: it was the formation of strong centralized states that led to the sometimes brutal consolidation of nations. It is important to note that in their modern forms, the "nation- state", "nationalism", "democracy" and "capitalism", were all born together - part of a paradigm shift in Western Europe, centred first in Britain and France ­ arising out of the Enlightenment.
This shift occurred just over the last three centuries during the rise of capitalism in its mercantilist and then free-trade phases of that early "globalization". Each ideological construct and institutionalisation obviously influenced each other, in the service of capitalism. When sovereignty shifted towards the people following the French and American democratic revolutions, the state became a more liberal institution ­ insisting on dealing with citizens as individuals ­ yet impelled by the economic exigencies to mobilize the entire society. The necessity for the "people" to perceive themselves as one became even more pressing and E Pluribus Unum became the call of the age. Territorial and ethnic boundaries were made more or less coincident as "nationalism" became the order of the day. Under the doctrine of cujus regio (ejus religio) the religion of the Monarch became the religion of the people and the culture of the dominant group around the Monarch, the culture of the nation. The economic and political concerns emanating from sub-regions were accepted and accommodated by dealing with them as "counties" but the cultural uniformity was non-negotiable.
Theorists of the nation-state have described how "nationalism" engendered and constructed nations and not the other way around. Actually what happens is that the elite of one of the ascendant groups, using existing cultural strands, but privileging its own, attempts to establish a hegemony over the rest of society ­ for instance, in Britain it was the English that accomplished this task - to create what they defined as the nation-state of Great Britain. The demands of the state are made coincident with that of the "people" - "nationalism" - the purported needs of the "nation" to be unified. Another theorist agreed and defined the nation as a cultural artefact - an "imagined political community" not created totally out of thin air. But in leaving out the word "political" in the title of the book he emphasized the symbolic artificiality of national identity while allowing others who never get past the title, to glide over the inherent contradictions between the state and the nation.
While the state and nation were stipulated as identical, in reality the state could never become identical with the people living within its territory. The state may represent the people but the people inevitably will identify easier with their "nation" as constructed by their personal experiences lived within a common language, culture and traditions, than their state. This does not mean that the state cannot be a site of identification for the people but since the values promulgated by the state being more abstract and "drier", these will have to be transmitted independently. Where there are different "cultures/nations" within a state, inevitable systemic strains are unleashed since to create the unified nation there has to be continued application of force, symbolic and physical, on some groups to maintain the "imagined community". It is self evident that groups, defined as being "different" on account of their disparate cultures have always existed in the same country. But for most of the history of mankind it was accepted that these groups could define themselves by their birth in a particular territory simultaneously as "citizens" of that territory or state (legally ­ jus soli) or as a particular "nationality" depending on their "ties of blood" ­ culture and heritage (legally ­ jus sanguinis). While all citizens would have all of the rights and obligations of citizenship, each "nationality" was governed, for instance, by the personal laws of their culture. Cultural communities, therefore, were the bearers of rights. As mentioned, it was only in the last three hundred years that Europe, led by England and France, began to insist that all citizens of a particular state only had rights as individuals and they must also practice one culture ­ become "one nation" ­giving birth to the nation-state.
However while the concept of the "nation state" has become a central pillar of the dominant European political paradigm and a dogma in modern politics, it is but a contingent moment in European history that definitionally insisted on the "societal consensus" and the "melting pot" theory of assimilation. Even within Britain itself, the Scots, the Welsh and most obstinately, the Irish never fully accepted the homogenizing premises of the nation-state. Within the bosom of this arch, empire-building nation-state, Ireland declared it would go its own way early in the twentieth century. The cracks have now become yawning chasms. The irredentism of German unification and secessionism of the Soviet, Czechoslovakian and Yugoslavian republics were simply flip sides of the rejection of the European claim that "state" automatically equals "nation". The actuality, of course, is that national unity is always ultimately impossible if it means homogeneity, since such a unity will have to be created (or more mildly, be represented) by a suppression of differences.
The contradictions and problems of the nation-state were compounded after those Imperialistic European states ­ again with England and France in the lead ­ during their 19th century consolidation phase, partitioned the world into empires and "spheres of influence". Claiming huge areas, which they divided into colonies for administrative convenience, the multitude of ethnic groups, (which, in some cases, as in Guyana, were created) within each enclave were suddenly told they had to become cohesive "nations". The onus was even greater in the colonies, such as those in the West Indies, where the local groups were practically wiped out, ensuring there were no "natural" cultural strains as in the European model, to evolve into any "national" culture and the society had to be created almost sui s. The local politicians who inherited the colonies adopted this imperialistic homogenising arrogance and insisted on even utilizing force, when necessary to create "nation-states". We are reaping the whirlwind, for while in theory both the modernization school of the West and the Marxist school of the East had prophesied the eradication of ethnicity and the creation of unified "nation states" (implied with the Marxists) history has proven them wrong.
The reasons for this are complex but essentially lay at the heart of the nature of power, the potential for its abuse, its relationship to status, the power of the modern state and the fact that the group that controls that power is invariably from one section. In a cultural plural society then, power always has an ethnic contour and will be challenged along that parameter. In ethnically heterogeneous states, ethnicity became a dominant cleavage along which mobilization took place even though those who led were invariably from the dominant classes. Thus behind its egalitarian façade, in Britain the English were always the dominant ethnic group, and its elite, the ruling class. And in the communist U.S.S.R. as late as 1989, nineteen out of twenty members on the ruling politburo were ethnic Russians. In Guyana, whether the PNC or PPP ran the government, it was seen by the group on the outside as the "other" ethnic group dominating the government.
The Consequences of trying to impose a "nation-state" in Guyana:
Historical
The conflation of "state" and "nation", in tandem with its corollary of ignoring the real nature of Guyana's society, has been one of the major factors that have muddied the waters of our political process. This is not been a matter of simple semantic slackness but yet another instance of living with the consequences (even if arguably, unintended) emanating from the historically demonstrated wilfulness of hegemonic powers to universalise their parochial particulars and forcing the rest of the world to fit their different realities onto the procrustean European beds. The greatest problem is that even those who can obviously see that the arrangements are not working, end up dealing with symptoms rather that (structural) causes.
The Guyanese State
From the inception of Guyana's creation as a European colony, there were a number of consequences, flowing from the circumstances attendant in its construction. Firstly, there would always be the need to have a resident body to protect the interests of the European power. Secondly, the fact that Guyana was not seen as a "settler colony" that would be able to attract large numbers of European immigrants, demanded that labour would have to be imported in light of the "unsuitability" of the local Amerindians. This implied absentee ownership whose interests would also have to be protected. Thirdly, the resort to slavery to fill the need for cheap labour further demanded that control over the always potentially rebellious slaves be high on the agenda. From their experience in Europe, all of these needs demanded the formation of a strong state structure by the colonists.
Even in the early days, when the Dutch West India Company was governing the colonies of Essequibo and Demerara, and Berbice Planters Association over Berbice, they assumed the cardinal features of a state ­ an arrogation of sovereignty over a particular territory. They always created a militia to assert that sovereignty, an executive body to formulate policy and a bureaucracy (albeit small) to coordinate activities. After they captured the colonies in 1803, the British merely expanded the state organs of the Dutch as the colonies grew in size and were eventually combined as in 1831.
Up to the abolition of slavery, it was felt that the forces at the command of the state and on the plantations, were sufficient to maintain order and realize the reasons for keeping a colony. The abolition of slavery presented new challenges to that control. All of the new relations of the society, whether between individuals or groups or between ruler and ruled had to be cooordinated within some macro- structure if the Colonialists were to maintain control ­ this could not be left to chance. Again drawing on their historical experience, the Europeans introduced the notion of the nation state as one device in their arsenal of control.
The Nation
The consolidation of the colonies are to be seen against the backdrop of the development of the state in Europe. The refusal of the British to give recognition to the various ethnic groups in Guyana, their insistence on cultural homogeneity and their use of the term "race" to distinguish Guyanese ("land of six races") was not mere wilfulness. The hegemonic discursive formation of "Guyanese culture" privileged British culture and by definition suppressed, repressed or hegemonised other cultures, all towards ease of control and domination of the labouring populations. Their practices were part of the project to maintain the unequal power relations between the governors and the governed. The present Guyanese society is the result of three centuries of a state induced homogenisation.
Even with the unequal power relations between the Imperialist and the subject, however, the imposed culture on the subjects could never be "homogenous" either in being "British" or "Creole". The British expatriates within the colony itself ­ spanning the chasm between the young Scot overseers and the Governor ­ exhibited a wide cultural diversity and then the subjects themselves brought their specific cultures into their encounters. The initial encounter between the Europeans slave owners and African slaves, one sided as it was, resulted in a Creole culture which by the end of slavery did incorporate significant (albeit innocuous, as it related to power) elements of African cultures. Creole culture to a lesser or greater degree was a European-African "hybrid".
Where, as in Guyana, the different cultural groups were chronologically and geographically separated, the resulting hybrid cultures, (e.g. Creole-Indian) while having some commonalities to the extent of shared experiences with Creole or British cultures, would definitely be anthropologically distinct to the extent that each group brought a different set of cultural responses to the equation. However, the British resolutely refused to cater for cultural differences, insisted on the idealised British "high" culture as the standard and focused on race rather than culture as the point of difference in the population. They thus implicitly postulated cultural homogeneity as the central founding ideological principle in the construction of a Guyanese "national" identity. The reality however, was that the society was resolutely culturally plural and the contradictions created between the reality and the "ideal" bedevil Guyana to the present.

Guyanese Society: The contradictions
There has been much discussion in the social sciences, of the development of societies/nations from a state of nature. One prevalent premise is that societies developed in an organic or "natural" way and the institutions that regulate or govern the people would have also undergone such a natural growth and development. Flowing from this assumption of the "organic society" view was that there would be a consensus on values and ends, along with integrative institutions, amongst the members, which would hold the society together ­ there would be, in a word, a community.
In Guyana one would have thought that, there could be no such assertion: our society is comprised of people who were snatched from several continents and dumped between 1621 and 1921 into our land to join the indigenous Amerindians to labour for the colonial enterprise. In Guyana, the various ethnic groups ­ Portuguese, Indians and Chinese - with the exception of the Amerindians were brought as indentured servants by the Whites from all parts of the world to replace the Africans after the abolition of slavery in 1834. Separated chronologically to a great extent, they were segregated into separate economic and geographical niches with profound and lasting consequences for their future relationships. While the separation may have prevented early sustained contact and possible clashes, it further reinforced the initial cleavages of race/ethnicity, language, religion and culture to demarcate social boundaries, which were distinct and have proven long lasting.
At the end of indentureship in 1917, the now "free" society was vertically stratified, with ethnicity and class generally coinciding in a given stratum. The Whites were at the apex followed in descending order by the Coloureds, Portuguese, Chinese, Africans, Indians and Amerindians. It was almost the paradigmatic structural hierarchical plural society, with the ethnic groups differentially integrated into the power structure. It is this differential integration that provides the dynamism for change as each group tried to improve their position. It was not difficult to foresee that "culture" would become a stalking horse for "power".
This fact alone ­ of disparate peoples - should have alerted our theorists and politicians for the need to possibly look at our societal problems with more sensitive lenses, and grapple with such problems utilising analytical tools different from those invented for societies formed organically. Today there would be few who would deny that Guyana is a multicultural society. It is not that the society is simply culturally heterogeneous in a superficial sense- every society in the world is that today ­ but that discrete groups in Guyana share enough culturally distinctive features to enable themselves to distinguish themselves from "others" and to act as a distinct group in a wide range of activities. The individuals in each group tend to live and work together, intermarry, (and of course, vote together) and share more personal relationships with each other. They recognise, in a word, their common "ethnicity".

Ethnicity
The term "ethnicity" encompasses a wide range of meanings. It is derived from the Greek term ethnikos, or ethnos, meaning "nation" or "people". It refers to a collective group within a society perceived by its members as having a common ancestry and sharing an historic past or cultural tradition. Thus "ethnic group" captures the biological and cultural nexuses of many groups, without the invidious implications of "race" - that biology is solely determinative of social practices. In Guyana, "race" has been used loosely in the sense of "ethnicity" with the pejorative bias. While ethnicity has been regarded as either a "primordial" urge or an instrumental manipulation by ethnic entrepreneurs, its salience and even its resurgence in the modern era, may be explained as a rational response of individuals responding to their circumstances by forming ethnic groups that lower transaction costs. Ethnicity, is always contextually defined and can be very fluid - but not infinitely so. In all cases it is also a politicised categorization as the ethnic group uses its distinctiveness as a mobilisational tool for political purposes.
In his seminal work, Barth argues that the defining feature of an ethnic group is not the particular elements of culture or kinship that differentiate it from other groups, but the mere fact that boundaries are perceived and persist. The membership criteria, and the membership itself, tends to change over time as people come and go and invent develop new traditions and ways of life, but the group itself nevertheless endures as a way of structuring social life . This is a very pertinent point in Guyana where some observers have argued that because all the groups in the society share so many cultural features in common ­ especially language, we cannot single out ethnicity as a salient cleavage. Many, especially the Marxist dominant modern political leaders of the PPP, PNC and the WPA, chose the cleavage of class as a more salient cleavage for analysis, prognosis and prescriptions for the society's ailments.

Class
Dr. Cheddi Jagan, founder of the first mass-based political party in Guyana, especially insisted that the analytic category of "class" was most "fundamental" and a much more fruitful construct for understanding Guyana's social reality and for formulating strategies for social mobilisation. He gave short shrift to ethnicity ­ at least in his analyses.
As a social construct, class had been proposed in a nineteenth-century Europe that had dealt with questions of identity for over four hundred years via the "nationalist" route. Especially in Western Europe "ethnic" questions had transmuted themselves into "national" questions by the time the issue of economic justice surfaced during the expanding Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth century. A great disparity had developed between the haves and the "have-nots' and Karl Marx was to discern several wider societal effects from that unequal economic relationship. Dr. Jagan and other Marxists strained mightily to fit the Guyanese society into the Marxian analytic categories of "bourgeoise", "proletariat", peasantry, etc.
As the Marxists are fond of asserting, no one can deny the objective existence of economic classes and this is true for Guyana. The question for us is whether individuals in the society act according to their class interest over other cleavages representing other interests ­ such as ethnicity. In Guyana, the reality is that class interests are subsumed in ethnicity ­ especially when political choices are being made. As we pointed out earlier, the society is stratified in a "reticulated" pattern, that is within each ethnic bloc there are distinct classes but these classes do not take concerted action across the ethnic divide. In Marx's words, "classes in themselves" have not become "classes for themselves" ­ they have not moved from being analytic categories to being social groups.
For the problematic of politically related violence that is presently under consideration, it is noteworthy that in the episodes of Guyanese modern history there has not been any broad, sustained social action to challenge state power across class lines. Even the economic strikes are split along ethnic lines. During the 1963 Public Servants strike, Indian workers generally did not strike against the PPP government, while during the Burnhamite years the public service workers generally supported the regime ­ against their purported "class interests". Presently, the Indian sugar workers consistently vote the PPP into office ­ even as they rail against their PPP-controlled union to stand up to the state-owned sugar company ­ controlled by the PPP.
The PPP and the PNC both claim to have worked to inculcate "class consciousness" in the populace and in this way they avoided dealing frontally with the central reality of political action ­ ethnicity, since the beginning of modern politics.

National Culture: The model bequeathed
The Assimilationist State

The model imposed onto the Guyanese population was strictly assimationalist, in that each of the groups brought into Guyana were expected to jettison their "native" culture and accept the superiority of British culture. While during slavery the insistence on wiping out the original culture of the Africans was more directly, by the beginning of indentureship the superiority of British was achieved through what has been described as the problematic of "hegemony". Aspects of the original culture may have been allowed to remain but the books, schools, and all the state and civil institutions were directed to disseminate the moral and philosophical superiority of all things British.
The assimationalist school totally privileges unity. It has been the dominant model over the past three hundred years, and still undergirds the policies of most of the states of the world, which define themselves as "nation-states". Its premises are that the people within a state must all share a common culture and values so that they would feel a sense of "oneness" to better work towards achieving the "national" goals. The key question, of course, is who decides on what constitutes the "national culture" into which everyone is to be assimilated?
There have been several variants of the assimilationist school ­ ranging from the demand that, as with the slaves, individuals entering such a society jettison their "old" cultures and live and practice the new ­ to such individuals being told that they should intermarry with others from the "mainstream" so that they physically disappear. The American "melting pot" remains the most famous example of the assimilationist school, even though there, the state through its school system and its very explicit "citizenship" examinations, couched the values to be assimilated in ideological, rather than cultural" terms. It is possible that the "White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant" (WASP) cultural ideal was so deeply imbedded in the state structure that there was no need to emphasise them. In reality for citizens to enjoy the full rights of citizenship, they have to conform to the "societal" culture. The French, following Rousseau, have been the most faithful to the model in terms of explicitly demanding the French culture as the standard ­ the best in the world as a matter of fact.
The unfortunate fact is that the assimilationist project has only worked at the price of great suffering and even then, never very successfully. America has had to concede that instead of being a "melting pot" it can only be a "salad bowl" where culture is concerned. Britain has had to grant autonomy to Scotland and Ireland in cultural as well as political terms. In Guyana while everyone was told to assimilate into British culture, there were always snickers from Whites when "natives" talked about "home". Ultimately, assimilation can only work if there is complete physical intermixing between the various populations and this is very unlikely.

The Contradictions in the present:
The PNC accepted the premises of the British assimationalist school, during its long twenty-eight year regime, accentuated the European/African hybrid Creole culture ­ with its "white-bias" - as the official culture, even as it made some innocuous accommodations to other hybrids. Many have insisted that the PNC had a multicultural stance since they introduced two Muslim and two Hindu festivals as national holidays. Actually, these were religious holidays rather than "cultural" ones. Mr. Burnham advocated a separation of Church and State, not least because it allowed him greater autonomy of action over the State, which the Christian Church colonial state had been privileged to such an extent that it had great influence and authority on state matters. State recognition of Hinduism and Islam as 'Guyanese' religions simply served to dilute the old established Christian influence (which had external masters) while Mr. Burnham quickly moved to control the Hindu Maha Sabha and the Muslim Anjumaan so that they could offer no effective counter challenge.
Burnham insisted, in his European "Enlightenment" tradition, that religion should be a matter for the private sphere He saw "culture", as 'secular" as opposed to "religious", and which should be controlled as part of the public space. While the ambiguities of such a disjuncture are legion, Burnham accepted the homogenising premises of the European "nation-state" ideal. He fervently opposed "multiculturalism" and summed up his position as "One People, One Nation, One Destiny'. The question, of course, was what would be the cultural practices that would define the "one nation" and to which all others would be assimilated. We can look at the record .
The symbols of a state signal its cultural orientation since these are expected to ensure that the people can identify with the state at an emotional level. The colours of the Guyanese flag, chosen by the National Arts Council, were the Garveyite pan-African colours black, green and red (which was already the PNC's colours) along with yellow from Ethiopia"s of green, yellow and red, which most African countries had chosen as their pan-African colours. The National Hero was declared to be Cuffy ­ the African slave who had fought the Dutch in Berbice almost seventy years before Berbice became part of a unified Guyana. The National Anthem has no hint of an Indian raga, much less any words from that or any other culture.
Mr. Burnham decided to modify the application of Marxist-Leninist theory, exposing himself to ridicule from orthodox quarters, to declare that Guyana's economic model would be the cooperative - based on the Ujaama socialism of Tanzania. Mr. Burnham introduced Mashramani as the grand festival for Guyana, with its Creole Caribbean Carnival inspiration hardly masked by the asseveration that it was about "cooperation" and taken from the Amerindians. Even though there is a "National" Museum, an African Museum and an Amerindian museum ­ there in none for Indians. This cultural imbalance, which is seen as a consequence of the power-relations, adds to the complexity of the political struggle.
Burnham went down the route of America, where the idea of multiculturalism is seen as antagonistic to the integrity of the state, even though the country is clearly acknowledged to be multicultural. The U.S. (as Guyana) had followed the British practice of distinguishing its citizens by race and expecting that all groups would become "American" which they defined officially in ideological terms such as equality, liberty, etc but privileged the British culture and experience of the "founding fathers". Burnham did the same with Creole culture as for instance when the PNC mandated that "Mashramani" redolent with Creole values and practices would be the national festival to commemorate Republic Day. The moral and physical violence occasioned by the exclusions of cultural minorities and the advantage of the "culture bearers" are thereby masked but not eliminated in the assimilationist state.

The PPP and National Culture
The PPP has declared that it also accepts multiculturalism as the cultural orientation of the Guyanese state. Its activities during its first 1957-1964 terms of office did show a greater sensitivity to the cultural aspirations of previously peripheralised groups but implicitly accepted the priority of the white-bias Creole culture. This has been its stance since it was returned to office since 1992.

The Impact of Culture on National Goals
If "culture" is a people's "way of doing things", then it will be the soil in which all institutional changes deemed needed to achieve national goals, will either flourish or wither. In a situation where the citizens of Guyana are attempting to emulate the success of their erstwhile masters, they will have to re-examine the values inculcated by Creole culture and decide whether these values are in consonance with their desired goals. For instance, during slavery, there was no point to slaves saving monies they may have earned on their Sunday day-off since they could not pass on property to their children. This encouraged an attitude of living in the present and spending money as it came in. Modern development economics insists that countries can only get out of their poverty trap if they are to raise their rates of savings but in Guyana, this value clashes with the entrenched value in Creole culture and leads to a vicious circle of dependency.
Similarly, on the plantations even after indentureship, the Indians were encouraged to depend on the managers of the plantations to make all decisions on their living conditions as late as the seventies. A spirit of dependency was inculcated by this paternalism as it related to managing the affairs their communities. If local democracy is to flourish in these communities, the people will have to be weaned away from their proclivity to look at officialdom to take care of problems of local welfare.

EQUITY IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The Proffered Paradigm:
Liberal Democracy: Historical Perspective

Democracy, like most value concepts, can only be appreciated within its historical context and development, we must always keep in mind the historical specificity of all institutions. The political institutions of Guyana were directly imposed on Guyana by the European colonial powers ­ which, since 1803, meant Britain. In Britain, the development of the democratic idea went hand in hand with the development of Liberalism, and for most Britishers the two were coterminous, especially during the phase of struggling for constitutional government. They are not and the famous distinction by F.A. Hayek is apropos: "Liberalism is concerned with the functions of government and particularly with the limitation of all its powers. Democracy is concerned with the question of who is to direct government. Liberalism requires that all power, and therefore also that of the majority, be limited. Democracy came to regard current majority opinion as the only criterion of the legitimacy of the powers of government." As we trace the development of democracy, which the British insisted should be practiced by Guyanese, it would do us well to keep in mind the distinction, occasioned by the exigencies of the British experience.
Western theorists trace the idea of democracy to the Greek city-states such as Athens of the sixth century B.C. At that time, to resolve a severe conflict between the masses and the "notables", Solon introduced rules of governance in 594 BC that was inclusive all four sections into which he had distinguished the citizenry. Within a century, as a consequence of an attempt by the "notables" to seize power in 508 BC, the rules were further expanded to form the "democracy" that we associate with Greece. The term itself is a combination of the Greek words ­ demos ­ "people", and kratos ­ "rule" or "power". The essence of democracy has always retained the element implicit in its name - "rule by the people" or "power by the people". In Greece, the citizens of the city would all gather whenever they had to decide on critical matters affecting their city ­ they had a quorum of about 5000. They preferred to make their decisions consensually, but if this were not possible, on a simple majority ­ that is, on a vote of one more than fifty percent of those assembled (hence "assembly"). This "direct democracy" could work because of the small size (between 30 ­ 40,000), and the total homogeneity, of the voting population ­ only Greek men born in the city ­ with women, slaves and other residents excluded. Plato and Aristotle (b . 384 B.C.) , citizens of the city state, were very sceptical about the efficacy of democracy, especially the former, as were most thinkers up to two hundred years ago. The democratic form of governance fell out of favour for almost two thousand years as the continent-spanning Roman Empire replaced Greece as the dominant power and adopted Christianity as its official religion. Absolute monarchy became the norm and "democracy" was thought of as "rule by the mob".
Christian insistence on faith (from St Augustine to St. Aquinas) rather than active judgment shifted the rationale of political action from the constitutional democratic state ­ the "polis" of Aristotle - to a theological framework that directed "true" Christians not to focus on the politics of "this temporal life". The belief that the Pope was "the Vicar" of Christ and that Kings ruled by his prerogative in a hierarchical structure with God at the top helped to give this period, for very good reasons, the label "dark ages". It was not until the egalitarian-oriented drive of the Protestant Reformation and the Renaissance that the claim of divine support for despotic monarchies was challenged. These imperatives obviously had to be worked out through the feudal structures present at the time ­ aristocracy, clergy and commons ­ and we should not be surprised that these groupings and their relative status dominated discussions of democracy. An early theorist, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) during the turmoil in his native Florence, proposed that the best form of governance to preserve liberty should be "mixed" and combine monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements, which would tend balance the social forces and to fragment political power.
In Britain, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) theorising in the chaos of the English civil war contesting the absolute monarchy that included the beheading of a king, proposed that men emerged from a "state of nature", where there is no power or state to enforce rules and life was "solitary, poor, nasty brutish and short". He posited a social contract in which men give up some of their rights to a powerful central authority (absolute monarchy) that ensured that the peace is kept. While Hobbes emphasised the liberty of individuals, and the need for social and political order for that liberty to be meaningful, he posited that an all-powerful state was necessary to achieve this. The important innovation in this century was that sovereignty was conceded to reside in the people (they should confer this sovereignty to a King) and having a common citizenship did not automatically compel a single belief. Hobbes' absolutist ideas were severely challenged, by groups such as the Levellers in Britain. Simultaneously then, theories of democratic and absolute rule had been formulated: the former strand ­ opposing absolutism - took root in Britain while the latter prevailed in Europe . While to the older British tradition the freedom of the individual in the sense of a protection by law against all arbitrary coercion was the chief value, in the Continental tradition the demand for the self-determination of each group concerning its form of government occupied the highest place.
John Locke (1632-1704) wrote within the context of the settlement to England's "glorious revolution" which found the monarchy restored, but with the acceptance that parliament was sovereign. Locke proposed that it was hardly credible that people who did not trust each other in a state of nature would repose that trust voluntarily in an absolute ruler, even to guarantee social order. Locke accepted Hobbes postulated "state of nature" but held that "natural law" governed there and made all men free and equal ­ with the right of "life, liberty and estate". To overcome the shortcoming that there would be, at a minimum, severe confusion since everyone can interpret the "law", he proposed that there should be a social contract, first to create an independent society and secondly a government. Sovereign power would remain ultimately with the people, who could remove their deputies or government if it did not protect their "life, liberty and property". Societies and Governments existed to fulfil the rights of man and the latter had a duty to fulfil their side of the bargain or the former could rebel.
By the next century, during which slavery in the colonies was abolished and "free"societies were established, the tenets of what was called, the ideals of "Liberal Democracy" was established and dominated Britain's political thought and consequently the model held out to the natives in the colonies. J.S. Mill (1806-1873) an employee of the East India Company, summarized the tenets of liberal democracy. Mill was in favour of "Representative Democracy" in which the people would govern through their representatives who would be "qualified" to make the decisions of state. Mill was wary of the "mob". The state, liberals assert, exists to safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens who are ultimately the best judge of their own interests and the state must be made as small as is possible in order to ensure the maximum freedom for each citizen. Liberals also focused on the necessity for government to operate within a constitutional framework that accepted the rule of law.
The contextual nature of the development of specific features of democracy can also be seen in the contributions of two Frenchmen. Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755), on a visit to England became familiar with the ideas of Locke and was impressed with the liberty of the individual he witnessed there, unlike the situation in centralized France. He latched on to Locke's mild suggestion that the power of government ought to be separate and proposed that this "separation of powers" was key to the preservation of liberty. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) proposed a historical Social Contract between citizens and their government in which the community (the "general will") takes precedence over the individual and is the source of the latter's rights and is owed their obligations. The state, in a positive way, is supposed to facilitate the opportunities of citizens to enjoy his rights ­as defined by the general will. Rousseau was part of the rationalist (constructivist) school of democracy that ended up with totalitarianism.
The American extension of the democratic idea arose within the context of their rebellion against the despotic power of the State (Britain) and their concerns over "factions" seizing power and oppressing the others. Their solution was to utilize and extend the ideas of Montesquieu and divide power vertically and vertically within a federalist structure that betrays the fact that substantively, many of the founding fathers were stirred by the Lockean prioritisation of "life, liberty and property". Democracy's reintroduction in Europe in tandem with the development of the nation-state and capitalism is not coincidental. The economic middle class, newly-formed by the spreading Industrial Revolution, were demanding greater political power to go with their burgeoning economic worth. The diminution of the powers of the monarch and the rise of the middle class was in each instance the pragmatic accommodation to a reality won through struggle. The struggle in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, based on the fight for equality, fuelled the growth and spread of democracy and has inextricably linked the two concepts. The slogan of the French Revolution of 1789 ­ life, liberty and fraternity has proven durable and has been a beacon for colonised people in the modern era.
However, the elitist current of democracy, articulated by J.S. Mill and other thinkers has remained strong into the twentieth century. The question as to who are the "people" who will give consent has been contested throughout the ages and as we saw for most of the time it meant a qualified elite. The argument was that the masses could never really govern and the best that democracy can do is to select between competing elites. In the Caribbean one commentator called it "Doctor Politics." Eventually this elitist focus became one where democracy was reduced simply as a method for choosing a government ­ and this appears to be the view of the PPP in Government. The innovation of "democratic centralism" as an organisational and procedural methodology by Lenin, which has been accepted by the PPP as an orthodox Communist party in 1969, is the quintessence of elitism. The question of the substance of democracy being integrated in the societal relations was put on the back burner ­ that was being "utopian".
What we have seen in the survey above is that in every instance, intense political struggles (often violent) preceded the introduction of new democratic principles when the leaders of the contending forces accepted new rules that accommodated the disparate contentions. Secondly, while intuitively "the people" exercising political power shapes democracy, it is not a straightforward, uncomplicated idea that we can take for granted ­ it is an omnibus value expression. Thirdly, democracy was, and never can be a static idea: the democratic institutions that we consider to be the standard has only been around for a hundred years or so and even in that time it has been considerably modified. Fourthly, the change in democratic theory has invariably followed the actions of citizens that changed the status quo ­ democracy developed through popular action. Theory, more than often, followed action, than vice versa.

Application of the Paradigm in Guyana
As in its country of origin and Britain, very early on in the colonies, two questions were posed when the issue of democracy in the context of political participation, arose ­ who were "the people" and once selected, how were "the people" to rule? On the first question, the British had conceded that middle-class men were "the people". Theorists such as Hobbes and Locke, who may have argued for an expansion of political participation, certainly did not believe that the lower classes and women were qualified to exercise the franchise.
In the colonies, therefore even after the abolition of slavery there was certainly no assumption that the freed slaves could vote. The British denied the freed Africans the opportunity to control the governing structures and justified this injustice by claiming that by the planters would outmanoeuvre the Africans. This exclusion of ex-slaves from the organs of governance and their struggle to rectify that historic wrong has had consequences that still reverberate in our political arena.
There had to be a period of tutelage, the British asserted, so that the responsibility of governance could be exercised "responsibly" by the "natives". Thus in Guyanese history, we note a long and painful process by the disenfranchised to win the vote and a determined rearguard action by the British to deny the same. As late as 1947, only about ten percent of the population were counted as "the people"; after 1953 it became everyone over twenty one and finally in 1968 it was changed to include everyone over eighteen.
A second problem arose when the country incorporated what was labelled several "nationalities" ­ what would today be called "culturally plural societies". J.S. Mill, for instance, speaking from a Britain sure of its "British" national identity could pronounce with finality that the free institutions of democracy were 'next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities'. There are undoubtedly countless issues that the institutionalisation of democracy will pose for Guyana; but the most important one will be to deal directly with the implications of the ethnic divisions in the society to answer the question, who are "the people" who would govern?
On the second question, how are "the people" to rule, as explained above, the classical Greeks tried "direct democracy", where, facilitated by their small numbers, every citizen could vote on every issue in one gathering. If more than fifty percent of the citizens voted for one particular position, then that became the position of "the people". Majoritarian politics was born. This direct method of voting had to be abandoned in favour of "representative democracy" due to the larger number of citizens and their wider geographical dispersion, in the countries that resuscitated the democratic form of governance twenty-two centuries later. The representatives were supposed to re-present those who elected them. However, even though the circumstances were different, the majoritarian principle was retained, and it was accepted because the British people saw themselves more or less as one.
A further innovation was introduced by the British, to accommodate local sensitivities and ensure that the residents of "counties" could be ensured of their own representatives. This was the procedural basis of the "Westminster" system of democracy where several candidates compete within a constituency for a seat to Parliament and one off them could win with a plurality of the votes cast. The innovation introduced the possibility that a party could win a majority of seats nationally through plurality victories and secure control of the government without obtaining a majority of the total votes. Applied to Guyana, the constituency system up to 1961 served to over-represent the PPP whose supporters were more geographically dispersed that the PNC's.

The Contradictions of the paradigm in Guyana
The Ethnic Security Dilemmas
Another problem presented by procedural majoritarian democracy is that even if the party winning the elections were to obtain an absolute majority, why would the minority go along with the majority? The answer by the Liberal theorists was that the minority knew that it always had the opportunity of becoming the majority on any given issue ­ it just had to persuade enough fellow citizens that their stand on that issue was the right one. This answer, however, only addressed an ideal situation postulated by Liberal democracy, where individuals voted rationally according to his or her interest. From the inception it was recognized that there could be what Madison called "factions" i.e. groups of citizens who would always voted as a bloc because of having entrenched common interests and not viewing themselves strongly as "one" with the majority. This proclivity acted to create or reinforce the divisions in the society. Nowadays, in one sense, we can refer to societies with entrenched "factions" as "plural societies". In Guyana, the factions are "ethnic" groups.
If one such faction forms a majority, then this poses a grave danger to democracy in that society - a "tyranny of the majority". In this situation, a minority would never have the opportunity of becoming the majority and would have to go along with that majority ad infinitum. Thus, in plural societies with one ethnic group forming an entrenched majority, "majoritarianism", a procedure for implementing democracy, becomes an obstacle to the substance of democracy ­ that all citizens feel that their opinions will be taken into account when decisions that affect them are made. This is the reality in Guyana today, where Indians constitute nearly fifty percent of the population and do vote as a bloc, and the Africans are over forty percent and also vote as a bloc.
The operation of the majoritarian procedural principle of democracy in Guyana precipitates "Ethnic Security Dilemmas" in the several groups given that if they each play within the stipulated political rules none can actually the authority that they may acquire once ensconced in office. In a phrase made famous by Dr. Cheddi Jagan, the group would be in "office" but not in "power". Most recently, the World Bank, in its report, "Development Policy Review" described the Ethnic Security Dilemmas in Guyana rather succinctly:
"Despite the fact that the ruling party (PPP) enjoys majority control of the legislative and executive branches, the political system has been characterizes by deadlock. This is in part due to the fact that the Afro Guyanese, who are the main supporters of the opposition PNC, are dominant in the public sector generally, and in the police and defence forces in particular. By virtue of its control of the capital city Georgetown, the Opposition also frequently paralyses the city to further its political agenda."

Both the PPP and the PNC have acknowledged the reality of the Ethnic Security Dilemmas ­ the PPP explicitly and the PNC, implicitly through the rigging of elections between 1964-1992 and sustained protests after 1992.
The Ethnic Security Dilemmas are inevitable consequences of the Guyanese demographic factors playing out in the Westminster-based procedural model of democracy. Africans could never capture the Executive and Legislature if they played by the rules of the game and the Indians could be checkmated from governing by the African-dominated incumbents of the state apparatus. This frustration fostered a dysfunctional political system where the protagonists have great incentives go outside the rules of the game to secure power. The frustration, in turn, has led to some politicians viewing violence as a political option and over the last fifty years political competition has been characterised by regular bouts of open ethnic conflict between the two major ethnic groups, especially around election times.
This reality forms one of the dilemmas of democracy in Guyana under the present Westminster majoritarian rules: how do we control the ethnic factions to preclude a real or perceived tyranny of the majority? It does not matter that the majority may be wise or just, the potential permanent exclusion of the minority from executive office vitiates claims of "democracy". In Guyana, from the beginning of modern politics in 1947, voting became increasingly influenced by ethnicity. With the Indian segment becoming a majority by the 1960's it was not a coincidence that elections became ethnic censuses. The African section, with its numbers approaching the Indians, had to deal with the possibility of being forever excluded from the Executive. This is the African Ethnic Security Dilemma in Guyana.
Democracy also presumes that the State will be managed for all the people of the country. Those who manage the affairs of the State have to ensure that they are servants of the people. Hegel called them the "universal class". If the staffing of the institutions of the state are in the control of any one "faction" then this presents another dilemma for democracy. Typically, the faction that is the majority also controls the state and in fact this is what produces the actual "tyranny of the majority". However, if there are circumstances in which a minority has control of the state institutions, especially if these include the Armed Forces and the Civil Service and the Judiciary, then the will of the majority can also be denied, since the minority would calculate that they have the wherewithal to challenge the majority violently.
This is the situation in Guyana where the minority African section has a vast overrepresentation in the key state institutions mentioned, especially in the Armed Forces, and has used this incumbency to neutralise the numerical advantage of the Indians. Even though the latter are a majority under the Westminster system and can form the Executive after "free-and-fair" elections, that Executive cannot guarantee stability, especially for their supporters. Before taking any policy decision, the Indian-supported PPP Executive has to always take into consideration, whether the opposition will initiate violence, under cover of their control of State institutions. At the same time their Indian supporters are under an omnipresent fear of being physically wiped out by their African political opponents, whenever the question of national power is contested. This is the Indian Ethnic Security Dilemma.
Amerindians have remained the most powerless group in Guyana since their first encounter with Columbus in 1498, even though everyone acknowledges that they are the original inhabitants of Guyana, and that their land was forcibly taken away from them. They were denied contact with the rest of the world, resulting in one of the starkest instances of underdevelopment and internal colonialism in the world. Being a small minority nationwide, if Amerindians go along with the present political rules, they can never have the experience of Governance of their own affairs. Their acceptance of their minority status within the majoritarian political system has destroyed their self-esteem and self sufficiency will continue to force them to accept the debilitating paternalism that all Guyanese governments have practiced on them. This is the Amerindian Ethnic Security Dilemma.

CENTRALISED AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT

The Paradigm
The Centralised State

The modern state evolved to accommodate the accumulation of power in the absolute monarchy. It was a very centralised state. The initial colonization of the "new world" was established during that same period ­bracketed by the reigns of Ferdinand and Isabella in Spain (1492), Elizabeth I of England (16..) and Louis IV of France (1780) who could famously (and without irony) "I am the State". In addition to inevitable imitation of the centralized model in the "home" government, the local state was further centralised to facilitate the regimentation thought needed to exploit the local resources. The colonial state could be called an "integral" state ­ one where the controllers of the state and civil society are the same ­ the state had no autonomy. While analogous to the struggle by the middle class against the centralised state in Britain, in the struggle by colonials to obtain a more equitable distribution of power, the centralised institutions of the local state were much more extensive, entrenched and recalcitrant. The Governor could arbitrarily change the rules to buttress colonial rule at any time he determined they were threatened. Additionally, the middle and ruling classes of England by and large did not equate their struggle with the aspirations of the colonials but posited that the latter needed to be governed firmly for their own good.
The British had an obsession with the necessity for "sovereignty" to reside in one single locus ­ in their case their Parliament, which arose from the historic evolution of their institutions of state and later accommodated by "theory". The British reinforced this postulated necessity by a theoretical and official aversion towards concepts as "Federalism" that would devolve power or the functions of the Government outwards to the regions.

The Application to Guyana:
Historical

From the beginning of Guyana's history c1621, its governance structures were very centralised and authoritarian - from the Dutch West India Company and the Berbice Association of Planters respectively, to the Dutch Government. The latter handed over its colonies of Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice to Britain in 1803 but on the condition that their legal and constitutional systems remain intact. These three colonies were united as one colony ­ British Guiana - in 1831, just three years before the abolition of slavery. But the unification generated severe protest, especially in Berbice, to force by 1838, an agreement to administer them as three counties, based on their historic boundaries. This administrative arrangement remained in place until 1980.
The British retained the Dutch governing structures but fused them into a "Combined Court", which consisted of a Court of Policy and a College of Financial Representatives. While the Governor had full power and authority, with the advise and consent of the Court of Policy to make laws for the` colony and was subject only to the articles of his Royal instructions, he was checkmated in financial matters by the Planters. This feature of governance would represent a source of tension between the Crown and the Planters whenever their interests happened to diverge.
In 1891, the Constitution was amended by the Crown to reduce the powers of the planters by expanding the franchise of the locals ­ primarily Coloureds. In 1928, the Constitution was once again amended, this time to checkmate the burgeoning power of the local African/Coloured elite. The new Executive Council gave the Governor great discretionary leeway since even the two elected members within it were both nominated by the Governor. The interests of the Home country were never to be challenged. The best that the elected officials could hope for was to "influence" the Governor. This insistence and institutionalisation of total control from the top has remained as a dominant feature of the local political culture and has even been strengthened by the successors of the colonial mantle. It remains one of the major obstacles to a democratic Guyana.
It is a tribute to British certitude (or arrogance) in the rightness of their institutions (and ways) that once they combined the three colonies of Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice in 1831 into the unitary state of British Guiana, they never tinkered with the arrangement. After all if they ruled Scotland, Wales and Ireland in a unitary framework after their conquests, as "Britain", why not a mere colony: the only imperative was to facilitate their ease of control. The administrative centre was Georgetown and all decisions were made there. Even birth certificates, passports, etc. necessitated a trip to Georgetown.
The development plans of the British were focused on the needs of the sugar, bauxite and other expatriate interests: the one indigenous large-scale industry -rice - was established on marginal swamp lands by the Indian indentured labourers. Whatever spending was undertaken were focused on Georgetown and Demerara; the outer regions of Essequibo, Berbice and the Rupununi and the interior were progressively underdeveloped. In the modern era all the light industries, the airport, the major hospitals, all Government Ministries, Hotels, etc were built in Georgetown and Demerara. The outlying areas were treated as internal colonies to be used for the extraction of primary products ­ gold, manganese, bauxite, sugar, rice.

The Contradictions: Extending Centralisation
The PNC Dictatorship
In 1964, the British changed the electoral rules from the constituency system, which favoured the PPP (the latter's Indian supporters were less than fifty percent of the population at the time but they were more evenly distributed across the country and formed majority in most constituencies ­ no matter how gerrymandered) to a Proportional Representation (PR) system, which allowed a coalition of the PNC and the UF to defeat the PPP. The fragmentation of the votes to prevent ethnic deadlock, which was the putative reason offered by the British to introduce PR, never materialized. None of this, of course, did anything to lessen the cleavages between the various ethnic groups: it merely increased them.
After 1968 the PNC jettisoned its junior partner, the UF, began to rig elections to remain in office. It explained to its supporters that to act otherwise would be for them to be excluded from power forever. The African Ethnic Security Dilemma was playing out. To hold on to power as a minority regime, Burnham introduced a form of governance, (post-1968) that sought to establish and maintain absolute control over the state and society. The author has applied a model of a totalitarian state to analyse the nature of the PNC regime, utilising seven characteristics of the acknowledged totalitarian Soviet State of the early fifties. The since qua non of totalitarianism was the pervasiveness of the regime's control, extending through and over every institution and every individual in the society. This totality of control was the overriding characteristic of the PNC's rule, under Forbes Burnham between 1968-1985.

First: a single mass party, led by a dictator. While Burnham allowed other parties to exist through the rigging of elections, these parties never threatened the PNC electorally, and Guyana in actual fact became a one-party state. That is, while other parties might have been permitted to exist, they were never allowed to effectively compete with the PNC. The other parties such as the PPP, UF or newer ones like Democratic Labour Movement (DLM) merely served to legitimise the PNC's monopoly of power in the eyes of the international community. They were to play the role of the "loyal" opposition. If they ever posed a real threat to the regime, as the Working People's Alliance (WPA) did briefly, then the totalitarian "sharper steel" was bared. Witness the assassination of Dr. Walter Rodney, the WPA's leading light, in 1980. In the same year (not coincidentally) a new constitution confirmed Burnham's absolute control over Guyana. For good measure, Article 22 of the PNC 's party constitution anointed him supreme leader of his party.
Second: A system of terroristic control. The House of Israel - loyal to the PNC, "Kick down the door" -bandits, arbitrary search and seizures by the police, police informers in every locality, assassinations, ostentatious marches by the army through apposition strongholds, etc. kept the opposition under control, and the population, especially the Indians, in terror. Indians responded to the pressure by mass migration: joining the earlier wave of migrants - primarily Portuguese - who had fled the P.P.P. initiatives during 1957-1964 terms at the helm. Soon half the country was abroad
Third: a near monopoly control over mass communication and education. The Government nationalization of, and PNC control over, the media (radio and newspapers - television was not permitted) and establishment of the Guyana .GPSA, in tandem with a program of harassment of the opposition newspapers through libel suits and bans on newsprint, consummated this imperative. The PNC removed the schools from church control, and then used these institutions to impose its vision of society, a new hegemony, on the population. Organizations, such as the Cuffy Ideological Institute and the Guyana National Service were created to mould the "new" Guyanese.
Fourth: a near monopoly control over the "coercive" apparatus of the state. The Guyana Disciplined Forces - Army, Police Force, Fire Service, National Service, People's Militia and National Guard Service - were expanded exponentially, staffed with a ninety percent African membership and placed under the command of a PNC loyalist in 1979. All Officers swore personal loyalty to the leader of the PNC, to provide, along with the similarly constituted Police Force, the coercive basis for the P.N.C.'s rule. The society itself was militarised through the formation of numerous paramilitary organizations such as its youth arm ­ the Young Socialist Movement and its Women's arm.
Fifth: the central control and direction of the economy. By the PNC's boast, they nationalized eighty percent of the economy by 1976 and provided rewards far in excess of the "Guyanization" of the managerial strata to which the middle class P.N.C. elite had aspired. Not only was their class expanded, but also they obtained a powerful device to keep dissent in line. Partly membership and support for the Party's position became prerequisites for maintaining a job. In Burnham's words those who were fired, stayed fired.
The co-operative, which was to be the cornerstone of the economy, was to be the vehicle for rewarding the lower class African Guyanese supporter. However, it was never the top priority of the P.N.C. brass even though they had persuaded their supporters it was. When the economy faltered in the late seventies, and the largess to be distributed to its supporters to ensure loyalty, vanished, the co-op concept was the first to be jettisoned and lower class Africans now also became peripheralised. African Guyanese now joined the exodus to the "outside". For those who remained, corruption was institutionalised, as it became the avenue of relating to and dealing with the system. Corruption was power and absolute corruption became absolute power.
Sixth: a near monopoly over all civil organizations. Trade Unions, religious organizations, schools, cultural organizations, and social bodies were all either subverted or controlled by the PNC intimidation, by buying off compliant leadership, or by the creation of paper organizations which were given governmental recognition and a place at the Government's trough. Indian organizations were co-opted through the opportunism of their leadership, to rubber stamp P.N.C.'s policies. These leaders were placed in highly visible, but essentially powerless positions, to create a façade of a "non-racial" Government. Those organizations that refused to "cooperate" were denied the same privileges accorded to the others and ultimately the former were miniaturised while the latter became paper organizations with only sycophantic P.N.C. shell "executives".
Seventh: an official ideology. The PNC announced in 1974 that it was a Marxist Leninist party and was reorganized as the vanguard of the masses . While there have been interminable discussions as to the "sincerity" of the PNC in its avowal, at a minimum, Marxism Leninism gave the PNC an appropriate vocabulary and methodical postulate for its excesses. To his credit, Burnham had always defined himself as a socialist and against all criticism, stuck to that definition.

Present Political Structures
As we have adumbrated, the PNC inherited a very authoritarian, centralised state and then proceeded to take that authoritarianism and centralization to new heights (or depths). In 1980 it introduced a new constitution that gave extraordinary powers to the new Executive President, Burnham. Simultaneously, a "Regional System" was introduced but when one views this against the sweeping powers and immunities conferred on the President and the central government in the 1980 Constitution, the decentralisation was more form than substance.
The Local Government structure created by the PNC consisted of ten administrative regions with the express purpose of decentralizing the governmental functions of Guyana. Each region would have a "Regional Democratic Council", (RDC) that would be elected during General Elections at the same time as the National Parliamentary representatives. The RDC's were assigned a budget and they were made responsible for a host of local functions, primarily education, drainage and irrigation etc. However there was not a clean realignment and delineation of responsibilities and the Central Government ministries retained a host of "supervisory" and administrative functions, which as executed ensured that no real power was devolved from the centre. Additionally the central government Ministries, such as Health and Education, retained control of all these programs in Georgetown, which is home to over a quarter of the population, further blurring any clear decentralisation. The resulting structure is an overstaffed, bureaucratic mess with overlapping and crisscrossing lines of authority and responsibility that ensures corruption, mismanagement and gridlock.
Agglomerating several contiguous villages within the RDC's further created a third layer of government - the National Democratic Councils (NDC's) - sixty-five in number, countrywide. They were granted a nominal annual central governmental subvention, in addition to being permitted to collect rates and taxes on homes within their jurisdictions to perform their functions. The townships across the country also function at the same level as the NDC's. The Village Councils, which had been the backbone of local government, especially by African Guyanese, was abolished.
After twenty-four years, (twelve under the PNC and twelve under the PPP) the regional system in Guyana is an object lesson in the pitfalls of "decentralization". Firstly, there had been no real delegation of powers: the regional officers remained completely under the direction of the central government officials. Secondly, the overlapping and crisscrossed lines of authority led to paralysis and an abdication of responsibility since everyone could point fingers away from themselves. The bureaucracy had simply increased in size without a commensurate increase in the level of service. The politicians used the regional system as simply another vehicle for delivering patronage to their supporters.
The politicians in Guyana therefore, by and large, never really questioned the premises of the unitary state even though they railed against British Imperial machinations. It is another instance of the local politicians envisaging their role to merely step into the shoes of the British upon their departure and to rule in the old authoritarian way. Unfortunately for Guyana, history has demonstrated (and recently with a vengeance), that if there is one law in the social sciences it is that a heavily centralized state structure in a plural society will inevitably lead to instability. A monolithic state exacerbates the inherent contradictions inhering in plural societies.

Constitutional changes since 1992
While the PPP had trenchantly criticised the 1980 Constitution when in opposition, it appeared quite comfortable with its provisions, after assuming office in 1992. Following ethnic riots in 1998 the PPP and PNC signed two agreements ­ the Herdmanston (1998) and St. Lucia (1999) Accords ­ that included within their ambit, the acceptance of Constitutional changes to reduce the powers of the Presidency, to decentralise governance and to make the Government more inclusive of the opposition. An all-party Constitutional Reform Commission was established and after countrywide consultations a number of changes were recommended and implemented.
One change, implemented in time for the 2001 elections, was intended to return some semblance of Parliamentarians being more "representative" by being elected from specified geographical areas, somewhat along the old constituency system. In an acknowledged one-off arrangement, twenty-five (25) of the sixty-five (65) Parliamentary seats were allocated to the ten regions. The agreement is for a more structured approach that would be accomplished in time for the next elections in 2006 and which would entail increasing the number of 'regional' seats and correlating them closer to their populations. Local Government elections were supposed to be held under a revamped Local Government system.
The other structural changes went primarily towards the strengthening of parliamentary oversight powers over Executive actions. There are now four Sectoral Committees that can inquire into all of the functions of Government. A Parliamentary Management Committee is supposed to manage the business of Parliament. Because there is a tacit understanding that the process of constitutional change needs to be furthered, there is a standing Select Committee on Constitutional Reform. Several Rights committees such as an Ethnic Relations Committee, Indigenous peoples Committees have been formed to help secure the rights of various constituencies against abuses by the state and other citizens.
A Disciplined Forces Commission has been constituted and has taken evidence towards fulfilling its mandate to inquire into the structure and functions of the Disciplined Forces towards making recommendations for their reform.
The tinkering with the Constitution has established that the major political forces have reconnised that the institutions of government need to be modified so as to distribute the powers of the state more equitably in Guyana. However, the incremental changes are evidently insufficient to change the centralised imperative of governance in Guyana, or address the Ethnic Security Dilemmas and other contradictions of the political system. The ethnic violence has continued undiminished after the changes in the Constitution have been implemented.

ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION

The Proffered Paradigm:
Imperialism and Capitalism - Historical
In Guyana, the question of an equitable distribution of economic goods has always loomed large in the minds of the populace. This should not be surprising in light of Guyana's origin as a colony founded on slave and indentured labour. As a non-settler European colony, the Guyanese economy was structured to produce primary products in agriculture and mining at the cheapest possible labour cost, for export to the metropole countries. There, the goods would be manufactured for resale to the very same labourers in the colonies, at a huge profit by the designated agents of the Imperial power.
The movement for the abolition of slavery and the agitation in India for humane working conditions for the indentured labourers left a legacy of sensitivity to the exploitation ­ economic and otherwise - of labour. In fact, the trade union movement, conceptualised to agitate for economic justice on behalf of workers was launched in Guyana as far back as 1919, long before political parties appeared on the scene. Most of the modern politicians came out of the trade union movement. The ethnic organisations formed not long after by mostly middle-class elements, were also concerned about the economic status and progress of their members. This was truer of the nascent Indian middle-class, which had a greater number of members from the world of business.
The historical development of the colony, by and large, led to ethnic economic specialisation and this was to have far reaching consequences. Within a decade of the abolition of slavery, the majority of Africans left the plantation and were channelled into becoming an urbanised workforce of lower civil service clerks, messengers, transport workers, dock workers, shop assistants, artisans, masons etc. The unbroken wave of migration, continuing to the present, soon created a large African urban underclass, which could be used to depress urban wages. Many Africans went into the hinterland to prospect for gold and opened up a new industry. Those Africans who remained on the sugar plantations constituted the major of factory workers who were inevitably separated from the mostly Indian field workers. When the bauxite industry was developed following WWI, the workers recruited were primarily Africans. The Portuguese and Chinese, small in numbers, also gravitated to the urban centres directly after serving their indenture contracts, with some remaining as shopkeepers in the newly formed villages. The majority of Indians, even after indentureship, remained on the plantations or formed rural settlements near the plantations ­ focusing primarily on rice and vegetable cultivation and cattle rearing.
Economic competition was sustained with the rural migration continuing as a constant feature of the colony's development since the towns were promoted as the centre of "civilised" life and higher standards of living. As mentioned, rural African migration precipitated severe contradictions as the African underclass grew while opportunities stagnated. The early success of the Portuguese migrants in business, which squeezed out many Coloured/African entrepreneurs, led to several African ­ Portuguese riots, notably in 1848, 1856 and 1888. The Portuguese were seen as unfairly moving ahead of Africans.
It was the beginning of the movement of Indians into the urban-centred occupations after the end of indentureship in 1917 however, that precipitated the greatest stresses in the society ­ some of which are still to be resolved. The Indians, building on their successes in rice, cattle rearing and petty retailing, began to open businesses in Georgetown by the 1920's and also. to enter the independent professions of medicine and law. These were very highly prized occupations in colonial society that helped to define status and when some Indians began to percolate into the Civil Service by the 1930's, the Coloured/African elite began to feel threatened.
The Indians were seen as a threat for a variety of economic reasons ­ in addition to the cultural and political ones. Firstly, the government had financed part of the cost of bringing Indians to Guyana from the national treasury, into which the Africans had paid taxes. This was akin to rubbing salt into an open wound, since the many African leaders had convinced the average African that the Indians had undercut their leverage to bargain for greater wages on the plantations after the abolition of slavery. Secondly, Africans feared that the Indians, with their immigrant drive for economic advancement coupled with their greater numbers (by the end of indentureship) would become so economically dominant even if they were to occupy only a proportionate share of the valued economic platforms, as to overwhelm them. This fear increased as the Indians slowly began to follow the path earlier trod by the rural African to the urban centres. Because of their distinctiveness however, the Indians stood our for continued comparison even thought they became heavily creolised. This very entrenched fear in the African/Coloured population by the beginning of modern political mobilisation in 1950.

PPP: 1957-1964
The economic development plans of the PPP administration of 1957-1964 stressed development of the agricultural sector ­ especially the rice sector. Even though the plans were crafted under British tutelage, the effect was to favour Indians, who were occupiers of the agricultural niche, to an overwhelming extent than Africans. Similarly, the opening up of trade with the Socialist Eastern bloc opened up agency arrangements ­ grabbed by Indian businessmen - that bypassed the old British ones, which were dominated by the Portuguese and Coloured interests. While the PPP established the first Industrial Estate in urban Ruimveldt, most of the businesses were opened up by Indians. These gains created a noticeable economic surge in the Indian community and precipitated intense cries of discrimination in the African community, which were a major issue in the 1961 and 1964 elections.

PNC: 1964-1992
State Capitalism
One of the prevalent beliefs in the African Guyanese community by the PNC's accession to office in 1964, was that Indians were in a position to control the economic activities and the wealth of the country and if this were combined with political power (in the form of the PPP) then the Africans would have nothing left for themselves, as citizens of a country that they had literally slaved to create. This conclusion about the "injustice" of outcomes within existing institutions and structures was the concrete manifestation of the African Security Dilemma. It led them to justify and accept the rigging of elections and other "innovations" by the PNC from 1968, which was explained was the only way to level the playing field. When the PNC secured sole control of the government after 1968 they moved to make the "small man a real man". Very soon it was apparent that the PNC saw only the "African man" as a "small man".
Between 1964-1968, the PNC, in coalition with the US pursued the "Industrialisation by Invitation" model proposed by Arthur Lewis, who drafted Guyana's first (1966-1972) development plan. A focus on infrastructure was supposed to facilitate the strategy but served to move funds away from the agriculture sector towards capital works employment. Massive restructuring of the rice industry was initiated at this time.
By 1970, with the UF out of the way, the PNC jettisoned the Lewis plan, announced that the model of economic development would be "Cooperative Socialism" and formulated a new 1972-1976 plan intended to "house, clothe and feed" the nation by the end of the plan period. Overall, the strategy could have been as easily described as State capitalism since by the mid seventies, it was characterised by a massive nationalisation drive culminating in the state controlling over eighty percent of the economy. The bauxite industry was the first to be nationalised, with the expectation that the learning curve of running industries would be first overcome by its supporters. The PNC then moved to control those sectors of the economy in which Indians were prominent such as agriculture and petty retailing. While the PNC would like to justify their policies as guided by the model of "Import Substitution Industrialization" where money is squeezed from the agricultural sector to finance manufacturing of items imported, the execution of the policy meant that the burdens fell overwhelmingly on the Indian population. For instance, the PNC mandated that all rice be sold to the government; bought that rice at a low price and then sold the rice on the world market at a high price thus placing a huge implicit tax on rice farmers and in the process destroying the industry.
The proposed spending in the PNC's 1972-76 development plan reduced the PPP's 55% of budgeted funds to Agriculture down to sixteen percent and redirected sixty-two percent to various public works where as in the previous plan, its supporters dominated. The PNC exacted a levy on windfall profits in the sugar industry (1974), nationalized it (1976), and further politicised and squeezed the workers to eventually bring the industry down on its knees. The PNC instituted an External Trade Bureau (ETB), which took over all importation of goods into the country, distributed through the intriguingly named "Knowledge Sharing Institute" (KSI) - most located in African areas, and put most petty retailers ­ predominantly Indians ­ out of business.
The co-op scheme was the vehicle for the "small man" i.e. the small African man, to become a "real man". Huge swathes of agricultural land, in all parts of Guyana, but mainly in West Coast Berbice, were transferred to co-operatives founded by African villagers. The newly established Co-op Bank (more jobs for the PNC elite) provided them with agricultural loans while the Ministry of Cooperatives provided land and technical help and the Guyana Marketing Corporation provided a market. Co-ops paid no taxes on profits. The PNC established at least fourteen housing schemes, with thousands of homes, all for African Guyanese. The upper and middle class supporters of the PNC were empowered through jobs in the enlarged public sector (including the nationalized industries) and the boards, and directorships of the Government Corporations. Unfortunately, the sad fact is that most of these policies failed and by 1980 Guyana was bankrupt and defaulted on its international commitments. Finally in 1989, Hugh Desmond Hoyte, who succeeded Burnham in 1985, had to enter an IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Program in 1989, which set as a conditionality that the economy be restructured to facilitate a free enterprise system. What had gone wrong?
The PNC proved several things, all of which had been demonstrated by the previous PPP regime. Firstly, no Government can exclude or penalize half of the population of a country and still expect development, unless it is willing to introduce slave camps. Secondly, if a group is thought to be lagging in any sector of national life, and there is a need for programs to rectify such disabilities then the need and the programs must be identified openly. While each Government may have been moving to rectify historical imbalances against, respectively, Indians and Africans, efforts to present the programs as facially neutral fuelled suspicions of discrimination and racism. These suspicions increased the ethnic and political polarisation, based on the nature of Guyanese ethnic politics.

1992-2004
PPP
Free Enterprise System: The "Washington Consensus" Model
The economic program of the present PPP regime is by and large driven by World Bank/IMF conditionalites imposed when the PNC had entered into an IMF/World Bank program in 1989 ­ dubbed the "Economic Recovery Program" (ERP). The Government has asserted that it does not plan to exit the program in the near term, so it is very important to examine the implications for Guyana in terms of growth and ethnic politics.
In 1989, one analyst summarised the common features of the IMF/World Bank programs implemented in the debt ridden Latin American countries and labelled them the "Washington Consensus". Very broadly the ten policies of the "Consensus" can be grouped under three headings ­ stabilization, liberalisation and privatisation. Individually, these were: fiscal discipline (2-3% budget deficits) to control inflation, public expenditures directed towards primary healthcare, education and infrastructure, tax reform to broaden the tax base, financial liberalisation ­ market determined interest rates, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalisation ­ tariff rates not exceeding 20%, removing barriers to foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation to encourage competition and providing secure property rights.
These policies are summarise the neo-liberal vision of the Free Enterprise system and are based on the assumption that an exclusive reliance on markets will of itself ensure that resources will be reallocated across sectors, that is, that the appropriate and adequate amount of investment will be made by entrepreneurs to produce the desired high rate of growth.
In the present circumstances the strategy implied by the Washington Consensus of the World Bank/IMF combine has grave implications for ethnic relations in Guyana, apart from the extraordinary leap of faith implicit in the above assumption. We have already alluded to the implications of the levels of entrepreneurial skills present in the various ethnic communities. More immediate, fundamental to the program was a much smaller role for the state ­ especially the bloated state that the PNC had constructed. A smaller government and privatisation of state-owned entities meant retrenchment of workers and this affected African Guyanese more than other groups since they were the dominant group in the public sector. Even though the retrenchment was begun by the PNC between 1989-1992, the perception that the PPP has marginalised Africans is still very entrenched.
What is clear is that in a poverty stricken country like Guyana, unless the economy is growing at a rate where there is clear improvement in all sections of the population, there will be an increased potential for ethnic conflict, since economic deprivations will be automatically linked to political discrimination, due to the proclivity for individuals to evaluate their condition in relative rather than absolute terms.
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Application of the Paradigm: Contradictions
In Guyana, by 1997, five years after the PPP was returned into office, the collective African Guyanese leadership asserted that they were lagging economically behind Indians, who had been helped by the PPP. The PPP had been accused of "ethnic cleansing" by the PNC as early as 1993 when they changed a number of functionaries in the Public and Diplomatic Services. Other African organizations, along with the PNC, in the succeeding years have claimed discrimination in the areas of house-lots allocation, contract awards, upgrading of infrastructure, employment of graduates and the general "marginalization" of the African Guyanese community. Most recently, the General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress has charged that the PPP government has practiced "economic genocide" against Africans. The PPP, on the other hand, has countered with figures in an attempt to demonstrate that their policies do not discriminate against Africans and that their social status, including economic standing and performances are quite comparable to Indians and that in many areas they are ahead.
In 1992, a "Household Income and Expenditure Survey" (HIES) was conducted, which showed that 43% of the population was living below the poverty line. It also showed that there was no significant difference between the per capita or percentage expenditure levels between Africans and Indians. In absolute numbers there were a greater number of Indians under the poverty line. Amerindians were shown to be the worst off by all economic indicators. A prominent African economist in analysing the data concluded that the African condition was dire. It was but so was the condition of the Indian. A World Bank's 1994 analysis of poverty in Guyana, utilising the 1992 HIES report, had recommended that funding for poverty reduction should focus on rural areas, since "poverty was a rural phenomenon" and spending there would have the greatest impact. Indians were overwhelmingly rural, as were Amerindians.
In 1999 there was another HIES conducted and while overall poverty decreased to 36%, this decrease was much more significant in urban areas ­ where Africans predominate. The level of Amerindian poverty had increased, and so would that of Indians, who were still dominant in rural areas.
What we can observe is that because of the polarised political system in Guyana, the policies and programs of governments will always be scrutinised very closely for signs of discrimination by the group supporting the party out of office. During the PNC's term of office, many such charges were levelled against them by Indians. Cognisant of this reality of evaluation of governmental actions through ethnic lenses, the Government of the day must factor the "ethnic impact" into the formulation and execution of its policies and programs from their inception. To state figures after the fact is not enough ­ by then, the damage would have been done. For the present, that the charges of economic marginalisation is prevalent in the African community need to be investigated by a bipartisan body, since it has been posited by activists from the African community as a prime proximate cause for extreme reactions.
Even as we agonise over our failure to improve our circumstances, we have overlooked the fact that not only "nation" but the "state" itself and the other mega-institutions are also variables and that they can each be modified to further our goal of bringing justice and equity into the cultural, political and economic realms and not so incidentally, deepening democracy in Guyana. We will now look at federalism as such an overarching political system.

Part 2

FEDERALISM

Theory
Like "democracy", federalism in its modern incarnation was the consequence of a polity dealing with a historical contingency ­ in this instance the Britain's thirteen colonies in North America deciding to form "a more perfect union". Unfortunately, the American experience has resulted in most persons focusing on the structural, territorial, aspects of federalism ­ federalism as a form of government - even though some of the early American political theorists gave much broader rationales for introducing the concept. The Swiss, however, not long after the US, adopted federalist principles that went beyond mere governance issues and dealt with the question of "national identity and culture" in a multiethnic society, and forged a most stable society and state. Just as with "democracy", the application of federalist principles will have to be sensitive to the nuances of the particular society as to which aspect of this omnibus concept should be stressed.
Federalism is not just a form of government; any "form" of human organisation is undergirded by an ideology or philosophy about how human societies can and ought be organized. "In its most general and commonly conceived for, federalism can be considered as an ideology which holds that the ideal organisation of human affairs is best reflected in the celebration of diversity through unity." Federalism, then, has its particular perspective on governance, to achieve stability with justice in pursuit of the good life - the objectives of most human communities. Federalists are sensitive to the Kantian caution that "ought" implies "can", so that an understanding of the empirical conditions of the society under consideration is an absolute prerequisite, since each society will have its own idiosyncratic enabling or retarding institutions and structures. And it is for this reason that we have spent such a considerable time on describing the Guyanese reality.
While it may not be a "purely self-referential" political philosophy, federalism does have a substantive as well as a procedural or structural/institutional component. The substantive aspect concerns itself with the sociological values that the groups in the particular society seek to realise, while the procedural component focuses on processes, institutions and organisational forms that the groups in society may utilise to realise their values by living together.
Substantive Aspects of Federalism: Sociological Federalism
Substantively, Federalism is centred on the values of liberty and freedom and seeks to give life to those democratic values by integrating diverse groups within societies through accommodation, and not obliteration, of their differences. In the post-modern, post-colonial world there is not only an acceptance, but a celebration of diversities. Even a staid British expert pronounced, as far back as the middle of the last century that, "one of the most urgent problems in the world today is to preserve diversitiesand at the same time, to introduce such a measure of uniformity as will prevent clashes and facilitate cooperation. Federalism is one way of reconciling these two ends." Federalism thus seeks to achieve and maintain unity and diversity: it addresses the innate need of people (and politics) to unite for common goals and yet to remain separate and preserve their respective integrities.
Federalism means organizing our society around the principle of freedom and autonomy rather than through the calculus of bureaucratic efficiency. From this perspective, federalism demands quantum changes in our conceptions about means and ends in politics. Federalism keeps in focus at all times this concern about means and ends and insists that we cannot intend to have people live in democracy and freedom, while utilizing institutions that stifle and restrict the liberty of the people. In general there is an inevitable lag between the institutions honed during times of more restrictive conceptions of human freedom and the more expansive ones prevalent today. In Guyana, federalist principles would have to infuse the new political culture to give life to the values of democracy, while institutional changes would have to nurture and inculcate these new values at the personal, social and ideological levels.
Federalism deals directly with the fact of pluralism in the post-modern world. John Rawls elaborates on the rationale for this reality so well, that it is worth an extended quote:
"The diversity of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern democratic societies is not a mere historical condition that may soon pass away. It is a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy. Under the political and social conditions that the basic rights and liberties of free institutions secure, a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines will emerge, if such diversity does not already exist." (my emphasis)
While there will be many expressions of diversity, from a political perspective, we have seen that in the post modern world ethnicity has become the most widespread one, leading to severe strains and conflicts in many countries that are attempting to pursue democratic norms. Federalism also addresses this seemingly inevitable and intractable conflict between nationalism/ethnicity and democracy. It combines kinship (the basis of ethnicity) and consent (the basis of democratic government) into politically viable entities through constitutionally protected arrangements, involving territorial and non-territorial politics. This is the central need of politics in Guyana. In the modern world where groups, especially ethnic groups, have not disappeared into some sort of mélange, and there are far more groups in the world than countries, federalism performs a sociological function by simultaneously facilitating the integrity of various groups and their input into the political system.
Thus federalism combines the seeming contradictory impulses present in all societies, but accentuated in plural societies such as Guyana, the need to be united (the principle of solidarity ­ and shared rule) and the need for groups to live authentically ­ (the principle of autonomy ­ self rule). To satisfy the first need, societies have to engender a unity of purpose to ensure effective governance and this inevitably leads to some form of concentration of power - but with federalism, this is achieved by shared rule, under a contractual basis. On the second societal need, federalism facilitates the freedom and liberty to make one's choices and this inevitably means a diffusion of political power in some sort of shared-rule. In organising around the principle of autonomy, federalism achieves a political compromise ­ union with autonomy, unity with diversity.

Procedural Aspect of Federalism: Bargaining
In 1795, the philosopher Immanuel Kant noted that the word "Federalism" was from derived from the Latin word "foedus" - meaning "covenant" - signalling the contractual basis that is the root feature of all Federal arrangements. Federalism proposes that people should make free choices in their relationships and that these choices should flow from conscious, negotiated, contractual agreements. Individuals are seen as autonomous and should then be free to define their associations both privately and publicly. At a macro level, for instance, the representatives of the various groups in a country ought to negotiate as to how they should be governed, that is to be able to craft their Constitution through bargaining and negotiation. Constitutionalism and "constitutional engineering" ­ to allocate power authoritatively in a society and state - are thus quite compatible with federalism.
This insistence on free choice is a fundamental point that flows from a view of human freedom and autonomy - that individuals know what is best for them and in terms of governance, should choose their representatives. This view ineluctably leads to the necessity for governments to have as wide a range of representation as possible so as to be as legitimate as possible, especially when those representatives are chosen on ascriptive criteria, as in Guyana. Conversely, the federalist insistence for autonomy of the individual is based on a view of justice that the individual should ultimately be responsible for his decisions since each individual had freedom of choice in making his choice.
As we have emphasised, while there are societies that may have convinced themselves that they, and their forms of governance, have evolved "organically" from some hoary past, we in Guyana can harbour no such illusions. Even more than other societies, Guyanese who were ruled for so long under rules imposed by others, who were objects rather than subjects, should acknowledge that the allocation of power within our society, and the basic policies structuring our activities must be arrived at through some sort of bargaining. Only in this manner will the necessary legitimacy be conferred on our governing institutions.
In Guyana, because of the widespread denial of ethnicity as the most salient line of cleavage, there is great reluctance, amounting to a conspiracy of silence, to accept that bargaining on behalf of ethnic groups is in no way morally inferior to bargaining on behalf of, say economic classes. Since 1957, the electorate has increasingly indicated at the polls that they consider it best that their political interest be represented by ethnic representatives. There can be no denial of the need to arrive at methods to deal with this peculiarity. Even though, as with all contracts, there will be the need to make concessions, negotiations at all levels will ensure that there will be widespread sharing in the decision-making and executing processes. We must have some sort of covenant for governance, which is the basis of federalism.

Procedural/Formal/Structural Aspect of Federalism: Non-centralised governance
Another value facilitated by federalism was also suggested by Immanuel Kant who contrasted federalism with "administrative centralism(which) leads to the loss of liberty of individuals, communities and nations." He thus spelled out another of the substantive aspects of modern federalism ­ protection of the individual from big government. As Kant pointed out, by dispersing power to many centres, federalism acts to curb excessive concentration of power against the always potentially tyrannical government. In this way federalism serves the political end of enhancing freedom and thus furthering democracy. This abuse of state power has been a constant in Guyanese history and has to be addressed within any democratic design for Guyana.
The principle of "subsidiarity" - articulated recently in Europe as they grapple with unifying a multiplicity of societies and cultures is an important initiative. The principle insists that for the most effective and responsive governance several, smaller centres of government and power should be created and most importantly, that policies be executed at the lowest possible level of government. This principle of federalism facilitates the participation of citizens in the decision making process and further enhances their freedom.
As emphasised several times in this paper, the unitary state originated in conjunction with the movement towards the nation-state during the last few centuries out of the same centralising impulses, for the accommodation of capitalistic economic expansion. Today, globalisation has moved capitalism to a different level and it is obvious that the autarkic nation-state is no longer needed when even small villages can forge direct links to the global economy. Today there is a simultaneous movement of states towards forming federations while within the individual states, there is a loosening of control over social groups. Federalism addresses the contradiction of a economically integrated world existing within a politically fragmented one and the twenty-first century will certainly witness an intensification of the movement of statism to federalism already in motion over the last fifty years. That seventy-five percent of the countries in the world are now governed by federalist principles is an acknowledgement of the paradigm shift in the relationship between man and state. Guyana and other countries attempting to catch up with the developed countries, have to leapfrog not only technologies of production but technologies of governance.

Procedural/Structural Aspects of Federalism: Form of government
As practitioners apply federalist principles to particular set of circumstances they would obviously arrive at a most wide array of political arrangements because of the diversity of the human social condition. The variant of federalism that is most popular in the average layperson is a political structural one, exemplified by the form of government found in the USA. where there are three levels of government ­ the Federal or central government, the State government and the local government bodies (city/town/counties). From a political standpoint, (i.e. from the standpoint of the allocation of state power under a standard of justice) federalism achieves its ends of freedom and autonomy, by diffusing state power amongst a central common government and several region/state/province governments, with each entity having constitutionally defined authority or competencies. The distinguishing feature of the federal structure is that the powers of each unit is constitutionally defined and those powers cannot be altered unless all of the parties agree to the change.
The functioning of both the central and regional governments is based on bargaining and compact ­ the principle of federal comity. The regional governments' powers are not "delegated" but rather the central government functions in such a manner so as not to infringe on the integrity of the authority of the component units. Most writers focus on this juridical understanding of federalism, which stresses rigid divisions of power. The famous British constitutionalist, K.C. Wheare defined a federal system as one where, "powers are divided between a general level of government which in certain mattersis independent of the governments of the associated states, and on the other hand, state governments which in certain matters are, in their turn, independent of the general government. This involves, as a necessary consequence, that general and regional governments both operate directly on the people; each citizen subject to two governments." There are three fundamental rights that characterize the legal configuration of the states/provinces/regions: the right to existence, the right to act in specific areas (competencies) and the right to participate in federal/central government.
After surveying the development of the nation-state in the modern era, one can appreciate the growing insistence by those who discern the drawbacks of a heavily centralised state, that all diffusion of power must be seen as "devolution" of power from a centre. It is a reaction against the premises of most practitioners and analysts of politics, especially Marxists, who conceived of "integration" as making a centralized state even stronger. Thus even when, for whatever reason, a federal structure was introduced in a country, many viewed federalism as a form of decentralization from a centre that remained strong. But the very fact that power must be "de-centralised" should alert us to the reality that in most instances of such initiatives, the "power" still has a centre and since the centre can centralize or decentralize at will; there is always the potential for abuse. The power structure would still retain a hierarchical pattern with the federal centre poised on top of increasingly larger layers of first state, and then local authorities. The federalist approach is to go beyond a mere division of powers and to propose a model where politics functions from many distributed centres.
Federalism therefore proposes a matrix of power centres in which there is no hierarchy, since the centres are "non-centralised" rather than "decentralized". It seeks to diffuse power to such an extent that it cannot be legitimately re-centralised without violating the letter and spirit of the constitution. In the words of Daniel Elazar: "The measure of political integration is not the strength of the centre as opposed to peripheries ­ it is in the strength of the framework: both the whole and the parts can gain in strength simultaneously." This does not mean that the central federal government has to be necessarily small and weak: it should be as small as possible and as large as necessary to achieve the goals set by the citizens of the country themselves.
This vision originated with the US experience that turned the traditional allocation of power on its head, when the founders of the American republic located power and sovereignty in the people themselves. The US Constitution delegated powers from bottom up ­ necessitating that the states, which were closer to the people, were the original recipients of the delegated powers. It was an early application of the principle of subsidiarity. This is particularly unlike the experience of the British ex-colonies (even federated ones), where the regions/provinces/ states are creatures of the central government, to be made and unmade at will.
The federalist allocation of powers spans a broad spectrum of governmental arrangements and the precise mix of competencies between central and regional governments are determined by the people themselves as to which level of government could best take care of the task at hand. To reemphasize the point made earlier, we support the principle of subsidiarity that declares that the task should be delegated to the lowest layer that can handle it.

Part 3
PROPOSED INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS -
WITHIN A FEDERAL FRAMEWORK

Ethnic Impact Statement
Federal and State
Even if there were not a propensity for man to compare himself socially with those around him (the social comparison process), the politics practiced in Guyana over the four decades have definitely ensured that every initiative of the Government is scrutinised punctiliously by the populace to determine whether there is partiality to one or the other group. During the first PPP regime (1957-64) the Government's allocation of land in the new Agricultural Development Scheme of Black Bush Polder, which resulted in a disproportionate amount of land going to Indians, caused a huge outcry in the African community, notwithstanding the protestations of the PPP that the distribution was conducted in a facially neutral manner. During the subsequent PNC's regime, the policy of the Government in the rice sector was bitterly criticised by Indians as being designed to destroy their economic base. In the current PPP regime the PPP has been accused of "economic genocide" against Africans by no less a personage that the General Secretary of the Trades Union Council (TUC). These are only single examples of a most pervasive reality that drives ethnic resentments that can be fanned into hostile acts descending into ethnic conflict. This social comparison process must be addressed right up front if there is to be any chance of any initiative being successful.
We propose that an "Ethnic Impact Statement" be issued with the promulgation of every Government policy and program whether in the cultural, political or economic realms. Recently, several Constitutional committees have been established that are supposed to evaluate legislation and governmental, as well as private actions, for ethnic discrimination but these will always almost be "after the fact". The proposal for an Ethnic Impact will operate in the same manner as the requirement for the now accepted "Environmental Impact Statements" that have to be issued before certain development projects can get off the ground. The initiating agencies, from the onset, would be made aware of the criteria that must be satisfied before the policy or program would be approved.
The actual mechanisms to generate the impact statements can be worked in detail out but at a minimum, would have to operate at the Federal, State and local levels.

1. NATIONAL CULTURE AND IDENTITY
We had identified two sets of contradictions stemming from the assimilationist cultural ideal practiced by the Guyanese state up to the present, as it clashed with the Guyanese reality. Firstly there was the relationship between the state and national culture and secondly the question of whether the state had a role in promulgating values that were in consonance with (or facilitated by creation of appropriate contexts) nationally defined development goals. We are proposing that both sets of contradictions can be addressed by programs that work best work within a federalist framework.
National Culture
There is no question that the citizens of a society must see it as a "common venture" even if they reject conceptions of "nation" that may be oppressive to existing diversities. "Nation" and "state" have to be disarticulated yet Guyanese have to achieve some commonality of outlook to survive, much less prosper in the modern world. The modern state is a reality and is the unit within with citizens act and which has sovereignty in the international arena, to deal with other states.
At independence Guyanese inherited a state but not a nation, since the reality of their coming together ensured that they had no common culture. The experience across the world has demonstrated that people do not identify with the state in a spontaneous, automatic manner ­ and that's partially why Guyanese have clung to their ethnicities. The challenge would be to construct a "unity" of the peoples within the Guyanese state that does not seek to obliterate the diversities but is more receptive and accommodative to self conceptions . One obstacle to such as unity is the refusal to accept that diversity is not the opposite of "unity" ­"homogeneity" is; and the opposite of "unity" is "disunity". The solution to the apparent dilemma is to accommodate diversity without fostering disunity. Federalism provides a framework for achieving this elusive goal.

Interestingly enough, Canada and Australia, two ex-British colonies, have taken the lead in redefining their "national" identity. They have both rejected the unitary "nation-state" model and chose "multiculturalism" as their ideology for unity. It is not coincidental that both these countries have federal arrangements of governance. In their understanding, multiculturalism is an official government policy that promotes cultural diversity, and the "national" is conceived as the space within which many (ethnically defined and even imagined) communities live and interact. It is to be noted that even though these were "settler" colonies where the vast majority of citizens originated in Britain and practiced British culture "naturally", they have pre-empted colonies such as Guyana, where British culture was imposed from outside, in accepting the legitimacy of other cultural strains to help define the "nation" .

Taking our cue from these states, it is proposed that we demarcate our cultural sphere as a private one, and not to be used as the criteria to build the overarching unity we need in the public sphere. The Guyanese state would adopt the policy of multiculturalism as a Governmental policy response to a multicultural society i.e. a society that is culturally pluralist. The policy response, "multiculturalism", must be distinguished from the societal condition of being multicultural. Most countries are multicultural but only a handful are multiculturalist. Multiculturalism may be seen as a set of principles, policies, and practices for accommodating diversity as a legitimate and integral component of society. This does not mean that the state has nothing to do with culture but that it does not privilege any one culture over others.
What is being suggested is that we move from the idea of a "national culture" as a site for identification to the shared practice of a political ideology as the basis for engendering such identification within the state. Rather than those, such as Rex Nettleford, who demand that all ethnic groups assimilate into Creole culture to become "one nation", we propose that a feeling of "we the people" ­ of "Guyanese-ness" - can be engendered in the process of our conscious construction of a democratic state.
We situate this construction of a national outlook within what can be seen as a project of democratisation ­ the creation of conditions where we are all treated as one, equally, by the state. Because of our diversity, such conditions can only exist in a federalist state, where our diversities would actually be accommodated and encouraged rather that become the basis of invidious distinctions. Equality of opportunity; human rights, encouragement of diversities, due process; justice and fair play and rule of law may seem dry compared to the warmth of the blood ties of "nation", but they can engender the unity of public purpose and the recognition of individual worth where all can be proud of their common citizenship. Citizenship of Guyana has to become something that has concrete meaning to all of us.
It was the United States, made up of immigrants with diverse cultural backgrounds like us in Guyana, that first attempted to institutionalise this ideological definition of "national identity" when they announced ringingly in their Declaration of Independence:
"We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."
All Americans see these shared ideological values as defining themselves ­ their "Americaness" ­ their national identity. When they established as their motto E Pluribus Unum- out of many, one ­ they meant "one" based on ideological criteria. The ideological foundations were intended to become supra-cultural values that would transcend the specific cultural inheritances of the immigrant. They succeeded to a great degree but unfortunately their founding fathers undermined the legitimacy of the ideological premises by implicitly assuming that British culture was going to undergird and suffuse this conception ­ they universalised the British cultural experience. This introduced the nation-state identity through the back door, which inevitably became repressive and has rightly been rejected by multiculturalist conceptions such as Afro-centricity.
Universalism is never power neutral ­ its defenders always have a certain interest in it. Contra to the local proponents of the universalism of Creole Culture for the Caribbean and Guyana, we should not repeat the American mistake here and privilege any one culture, and consequently one group. Similarly, since the state itself had justified its legitimacy through the goal of all its citizens living by the principles and values of its ideology, if this is seen not to be the reality for some, the status quo will be challenged by the excluded. The movement towards allowing citizens to constantly authenticate themselves ideologically is always enabled: multiculturalism becomes part and parcel of the "nation by design".
For Guyana then, our ethnicities would be defined outside our "Guyaneseness" and to be African-Guyanese or Indian-Guyanese would not be contradictory in any sense. The first part of our identity would be specific while the latter universalistic. The "national" will now be a space where ethnic communities can live and share. To be Guyanese would be to share public moral precepts ­ norms, values and attitudes ­ rather than necessarily, shared cultural experience and practice. To the extent that they are shared it is to be lauded but it must never be at the imperative to jettison one culture. A "good" Guyanese would be one who is loyal to this country and strives to practice the secular universalistic ideological values it extols. Not so long ago, for instance Guyanese of all ethnicities held "hospitality" as a cardinal value of being Guyanese.
Guyana is therefore is at a critical moment where we are attempting to ensure that state power is equitably distributed amongst the several ethnic groups in our society which is a precursor to the creation of the space necessary for such co-existence. Multiculturalism is not just about cultural practices: it is also a signifier of the power relations of the society. It is only when power is distributed equitably that the ideological values mean anything to the culturally embedded individual. This is the content of a national identity.
But what would be the incentives for creating such a state? They would be the same incentives that spurred the development of every other democracy ­ crises and social conflicts. Our present crisis, starting in 1998, has already precipitated a wide-ranging discourse as to what state structures may distribute power more equitably in Guyana and there is now a permanent Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional change. The test of our democratic system would be to successfully mediate the social conflicts in our society and achieve such goals as economic growth, material security, cultural autonomy and freedom from arbitrary violence.

The state and national culture
The Balanced Federalist State
There are several models that have been proposed as alternatives to the assimilationist state that we have rejected. At first sight, the "neutral state" that announces an equidistant stance towards all cultural strains, appears quite reasonable but there are several inherent defects if it were to be applied to Guyana. The neutral state privileges unity and would take a purported complete hands-off position on the cultures of the citizens and would only work to create an environment where the various groups would be able to express their cultures. The citizens would merely agree on a minimum program for the state to deliver and the state would have a procedurally neutral mode of operation in executing that program.
The problem, of course, is that there can be no such thing as a "neutral" state and there is the ever-present danger of a dominant cultural community imposing their cultural standards over the operations of the State. Firstly, even procedures are embedded in some moral premise and secondly, the state itself ­ in terms of its structure and its allocation of authority ­ would arise out of some conception of the good life. This conception, which would include political life, may be oppressive or contrary to the values of some cultural group in the society and should be re-examined in light of other contributions. While this model seeks not to privilege either unity or diversity, the inevitable systemic continuities of our historical development means that the status quo would be maintained ­ and this means dominance of the old hegemonic culture and the withering away of the other cultures as each generation continue to try to "fit" in by changing their behaviour. In the case of Guyana, the white-bias Creole culture dominates the operations of the state, which inevitably becomes its promulgator and protector.
The proposal we favour is the "balanced state" which is the position of most Liberals in that the state seeks to give unity and diversity an equal status, The state would insist that all citizens must share a common political culture ­ in which all individuals, qua individuals, would share common political institutions, values etc, and a commitment to the political community. Groups that did not share the dominant culture would have to assimilate to the extent that they would have to accept the premises of the political culture to engage in its practices, but would be free to practice the other tenets of their individual cultures. Politics is seen a public realm in which everyone engages and constitutes a "unity" while "culture" occupies a private realm that accommodates diversity and in which everyone "does their own thing". The culture of each culture would have to be given space and respect and protection.
"Balanced" however does not mean that the state has to be oblivious to inequities and inequalities in the cultural sphere, Affirmative action does not have to be confined to the economic realm alone: culture is as much a primary "social good"- as any thing else. The fact that each group has a cultural history that shapes its place in the social order, often marked by inequalities of power can obviously negate the doctrine of pluralism implicit in the balanced state, by giving the previously privileged groups an advantage. Secondly, the democratic values of liberty, equality etc. embedded within a constitutional order, should give the community the commitment to ends. Unfortunately, the neat compartment-alisation of public and private spheres never works that way in practice. As pointed out above, the political public sphere is inevitably embedded in the cultural practices of segment. The prestige that the public imprimatur and acknowledgement of these practices bestow on that segment, put other groups at a severe disadvantage in that they are seen as marginal and second rate ­ something to be hidden from the public gaze.
This is where federalist practices and principles can be used to overcome the deficiencies of the balanced liberal state. The problem with the "balanced state" is that the political culture into which everyone has to assimilate is not neutral ­ it would reflect the premises of the dominant "societal" culture, which other groups had no role in determining. For example, from their position as the authoritative citizens, Creoles would be able to erect institutions and to behave in ways that enforced their notions of social, political, and economic behaviour.
The federalist state in its promulgation would privilege both unity and diversity and, in accepting that it is ineluctably and dynamically shaped by forces in the society, work normatively to facilitate inclusiveness in its structures. The federalist state would not separate the political and cultural realms in terms of support and would accept diversity as a given in all realms and facilitate it. It would even insist that the political realm is not beyond negotiation and would accept inputs that would allow all groups to identify with the system. It has been accepted in Canada, Australia and Sweden while India practices many of its tenets.
The federalist state would ensure that no culture is treated as second rate by ensuring that none is treated like second class. Therefore, it is proposed that we should adopt a the post-modern federalist frame of reference that includes factors that will enhance diversity. In fact, the most powerful idea of the new cultural framework is that a decent respect for the principle of diversity, the integrity of the diverse groups, and the equality among them will provide the basis of a truly democratic society. To the extent that this notion is reflected in law and in social practice among groups and individuals, the basis of a new democracy will be laid.
National Culture and National Goals
We had posed the question of whether the state had a role in promulgating values that were in consonance with (or facilitated by creation of appropriate contexts) nationally defined development goals. In the economic realm, there has been a school of thought that posits that the economic development of the West was facilitated by a "Protestant Ethic", which suffused the culture of the European nations that led the way in the Industrial Revolution. The remarkable success of Japan and other non-Christian countries in the Far East demonstrates that the necessary values for development may not only be present in Protestantism.
In a larger sense, however, we have to appreciate that all of Western Culture, which is the dominant component of Guyanese Creole culture, is suffused by Christian values. Groups in the West who may have come from other cultural traditions have had to deal with the implicit and explicit value-premises of this paradigm on a daily basis. The activities of the state thus inevitably have both a general and specific impacts on cultural practices and these impacts must be evaluated on an ongoing basis. Culture in its broadest sense would include all of a society's ways of doing things and different cultures may have different perspective on how a particular goal is to be achieved. The designated role of the state to foster development would obviously have an effect and be affected by various cultural repertoires present in the society.
The key point would be to ensure that goals sought to be achieved are "national" goals, that is, that most of the groups in the society have decided that they want to achieve the goal. What this means that if the achievement of the goal is dependent on the introduction of a particular institution ­ and all institutions are centred on one or more values ­ and these are at variance with an entrenched value of one or more groups, then there should be a discussion by the concerned as to whether they will change or modify their cultural practice re the proposed value. Culture is the soil in which all proposed changes will either take root or wither. Innovations in consonance with entrenched values will be more easily be accepted and succeed.
There are two points to note. Firstly Japan and the Far East, as well as Malayasia, with non-Christian religions and non-Western cultures, have demonstrated that there is not necessarily one way to achieve a particular goal. This means that a group may be able to utilise a cultural idiosyncrasy to achieve the desired goal without jettisoning anything. Secondly, and following from the first point, is that the wider the cultural resources of a society is, the more opportunity it has of dealing with contingencies ­ including those of development. Diversity then, is an asset in the modern world from even this very pragmatic point of view.
In every modern country, the goals of the society ­ including production and productivity ­ will be achieved through the operations of the right mix of three institutions ­ the state, the market, and the community. The state coordinates the activities of citizens through command and coercion. It is supposed to be acting for the common good. The state passes laws and makes regulations that affect the economic activities of the citizenry every day. As an example, the experience of the Far East shows that a high internal savings rate is crucial for economic development but if the Government's interest-rate policy is to facilitate this goal the citizenry's perspective on savings and consumption will have to be taken into consideration.
Markets function through competition using prices as the mechanism to coordinate production and consumption ­ they are based on self-interest. It is very efficient mechanism from a production point of view ­ people will produce to make profits. But one of the premises for its success is there should be enough people willing to take the risks etc to make that profit (entrepreneurs). This is partly a question of culture. The question arises as what is to be done when, as in Guyana, the entrepreneurs are primarily from one ethnic group? The PPP government has now jumped on the neo-liberal bandwagon and is counting on markets to solve most problems ­ but is not considering the impact of the cultural differentiation.
Communities also structure the activities of citizens ­ through voluntary cooperation engendered by close personal ties and relationships. Communities work through trust and this is one on the reasons for the increases relevance of ethnicity. The role of communities has been a most neglected aspect in the development efforts of third world countries such as Guyana. Let's take the rice industry. A crucial feature of rice cultivation is the control and allocation of water. In Asia where there has been intensive cultivation for centuries, the communities have evolved intricate local, non-government sanctions and rewards that ensure the most efficient use of water. Compare this with our situation in Guyana where farmers downstream are never willing to wait for water, in their turn and they either surreptitiously open regulators or "talk" to their friends in authority. Everyone ends up frustrated and costs go up when they have to pump water. China's and Vietnam's ability to produce rice at one quarter of our costs is not just due to low labour costs.
The Federalist sociological thrust is to foster links that are already in existence in the populace to be the nucleus of change desired in other aspects of the society's goals. The perspective of accepting communities as agents of change have been neglected too long and it is only a federalist's approach that will get the central politicians and bureaucrats off the backs of the locals and allow them to rise to their potential. The federalist emphasis on preserving diversities should engender intense analysis as to alternative techniques to achieve of national goals and make the whole society the richer.

Concerns on federalism reifying ethnicity
Concerns have been raised that federalism may reify ethnicity in Guyana, that is, give it more substance and reality than it actually possesses at this time, since the states/regions would have separate ethnic majorities. The fear arises out of a false dilemma that posits "ethnic identity" as in contradiction to being "Guyanese". As we have shown, in the "balanced" multiculturalist state, the cultural and political realm would occupy different, and in most instances, non-conflicting realms. The concern is alsoactually the reverse of the assimilationist argument since the premise is that there is no problem with the present structures and institutions reifying the dominant cultural practices.

Concerns over "artificiality" of proposed federal boundaries for Guyana
- There is no feeling of togetherness/history in the states/regions:
This charge of artificiality in the proposed states/regions ignores the history in which the three countries of Berbice, Essequibo and Demerara were not combined into one country until 1831, just before the abolition of slavery. In fact at the point of unification in 1831, Berbice resisted the then proposal for all the colonies to be governed as one. The proposal was withdrawn and the counties were administered separately until 1980 when the ten regions were introduced for administrative convenience. Over that time the residents have developed a strong sense of identification with their counties ­ for instance, Berbicians are Berbicians in all areas of life. They even have their particular way of speaking.
In each of these areas the residents have a highly developed sense of commonality. The Amerindians have actually been encouraged in retaining their indigenous culture and their system of village governance with their Tachaus or Chiefs is being resusicated to give them a unique type of local government.
The federalisation of Guyana will allow the old points of identity to be rekindled ­ and these identities encompass various ethnicities and after some time may help to dissipate some of the ethnic polarisation. In modern times Berbicians, Essequibians, and the Hinterland inhabitants have been very proud that they did not descend into the ethnic violence and riots of the sixties and in the present and the relations between the various groups, even at times of political conflict are much more easy and intimate than in Demerara.

2. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION :
Democracy

Equity in distribution of Power
During 1963, in the midst of the joint US-British operation to remove the PPP from office, when the leaders of the PPP, PNC and UF could not reach agreement on a way forward on Constitutional measures following ethnic violence that had wracked the country, the British Secretary of the State for the Colonies summarised the ethnic security dilemmas of the Indians and Africans very starkly:
"the Premier (Dr. Jagan) told me that, if the British troops were withdrawn, the situation would get completely out of control.
The root of the trouble lies entirely in the development of party politics along racial lines.Both parties (PPP and PNC) have, for their political ends, fanned the racial emotions of their followers, with the result that each has come to be regarded as the champion of one race and the enemy of the other.
The Africans accuse the Government party of governing in the interests only of the Indians, and demand a share in political decisions. On the other side, the Indians accuse the Police, which is mainly African, of partiality towards the Africans and demand the creation of a separate defence force, recruited more extensively from the Indian community, to counterbalance the Police."
In their proposals to break the impasse, the British pointed out that there was, in general, the need "to protect minorities" and in particular, to address "the racial nature of the problem". For the latter problem, "the Government should endeavour to rule with the general consent of the population (and a new armed force) should be constituted before independence by the Governor, who would endeavour to ensure that recruits were not drawn predominantly from any one racial group." The first exhortation went to the African Security Dilemma and the second, to the Indians'.
The British recognised that under the existing conditions, neither the PPP and PNC would be able "to increase appreciably its following among the other racial groups." They then concluded that, "it must be our deliberate aim to stimulate a radical change in the present pattern of racial alignments. It was therefore my duty to choose the electoral system which would be most likely to encourage inter-party coalitions and multi-racial groupings". After choosing proportional representation (PR) and jettisoning the constituency system, the Secretary predicted, "proportional representation would be likely to result in the formation of a coalition government of parties supported by different races, and that this would go some way towards reducing the present tension." The British therefore clearly recognised the need for all the major races to be represented in the Government, if it wanted to govern effectively.
Sadly, while the British had a very good diagnosis of what ailed Guyana, their prescription of "proportional representation", in and of itself, was inadequate to fulfil the stated goals. The proposals were compromised because of the British's prior agreement with the Americans to remove Dr. Jagan and the PPP from office and precluded any arrangement that would give the PPP, representatives of the Indians, any share of power. They introduced no structural mechanisms that went to the nature of the conflict ­ PR on its own, was simply a device to allow the PNC and the UF to coalesce and elbow out the PPP. The British, however, had recognised the shortcomings of their proposals and the need for more far-reaching changes: "the creation of temporary alliances in Parliament between the representatives of rival groups, though a step in the right direction, is not enough. Normal conditions will not be restored until the racial alignments are replaced by genuine political alignments based upon a common belief in political and economic objectives."
The hoped-for new "political alignments" did not take place after the 1964 elections, which were the most polarised in the history of Guyana ­ up to then and since. The whole country was treated as one constituency and since every vote now counted for the overall allocation of seats, this created a great incentive for "not splitting the vote". As we have recounted, the PNC during its long twenty eight year regime attempted to obliterate the political divide through the "control" form of governance ­ even though they promoted co-operative socialism as the "common belief in political objectives". They did not succeed. After 1992, the PPP has been forced to make some changes in the mode of governance, to be more accommodative to the PNC.
The innovations, however have not go far or as fast enough, to resolve the ethnic security dilemmas. The incremental approach chosen is fraught with danger in that it holds out expectations of resolving the impasse but can be, and has been, sabotaged by elements in both camps who only see the measures as tactical manoeuvres to make the other side look bad and who are merely manoeuvring to gain advantage so as to secure all power for their group. Federalism is the political approach, we believe, that can move the process of participation and democratisation further by incorporating the specific proposal adumbrated in this paper
From 1998, the writer and others reintroduced into the public discourse the federalist proposals first proffered in 1988, as the system of governance for Guyana. Responding to a series of questions in the national press for clarification on the proposal, the answer gives a good summary of the major structural changes necessary:

Formal Structural Factors: Application to Guyana
We feel that democracy cannot be imposed in procrustean fashion but rather has to be planted in the soil of Guyana only after taking full cognisance of our local conditions.
The Future State
Q1: Would Guyana continue to be a sovereign polity?
A1: Yes.
Q2: What would be the jurisdictional parameters of the central government in the areas of legislation, executive authority and judicial competence?
A2: The federal government will have exclusive executive and legislative competence over Defence, Currency (Central Bank), Banking, Foreign Affairs, Federal Elections, Censuses and regulation of Trade and Commerce. The federal government will also have concurrent competencies with the states/regions over a specified number of other areas. The Supreme Court will be a federal body and will act as the Constitutional Court with the power of judicial Review.
Q3: What office will embody the sovereign authority of this entity and how will this office be filled?
A3: Sovereignty will reside in the people and will be delegated to the organs of the Federal/State Executives, Legislatures and Judiciary as specified in the Constitution; with all residual powers resting with the states. The Executive and Legislative branches will be filled through elections while the Judiciary will be appointed.
Q4: Will the concept underlying the allocation and exercise of state power be devolutionary, contributory or co-equal as between the State and its constituent units?
A4: Co-equal. In Federalism, we envisage power to be "non-centralised" rather than "decentralized", since the latter retains a hierarchical relationship.
Q5: How will the exercise of state power, as between the central foci of authority be mediated and balanced?
A5: There will be institutionalised meetings between the President (the head of the Federal Government), and the State/regional Governors in addition to the specific-purpose Commissions that will coordinate the operations of the concurrent powers.
Q6: The Supreme Court will have the power of Judicial Review. The members of this body will be nominated by the President and confirmed by a simple majority vote of the Upper House of the Legislature.
The Component Units
Q1: Will these units be defined by geographic boundaries?
A1: Yes. These will be Berbice, Demerara, Essequibo and Rupununi (which will consist of regions #8 and #9 from the present "Essequibo").
A2: What methodology is being proposed for use in effecting the demarcation of these boundaries?
A2: The boundaries are already demarked.
Q3: How is it proposed to obtain consensual and universal acceptance of these boundaries?
A3: The concept will have to be voted on by the populace.
Q4: How will residency in, and movement between, the component units be regulated?
A4: To become a resident of a particular state/region, one would have had to be in continuous residence there for one year. Movement between the states/regions will be free and unrestricted.
Q5: Will these units be sovereign? Will they have the right to secede from the inclusive conglomerate?
A5: In all Federal countries, sovereignty is shared between the Federal and constituent states/regions. The latter will not have the right of succession?
Q6: What rights will persons who do not belong to the dominant ethnic group in any proposed component unit have there? How will their rights be protected and be made enforceable?
A6: All citizens will have equal rights under federal and state laws. These rights will be secured through constitutionally justiciable clauses effectuated through a Federal Race Relations Boards and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission etc.
Q7: Is it proposed that functions such as policing, education, health-policy, trade and commerce regulations will be vested in these proposed units?
A7: Policing will be concurrent between Federal and state/regional governments, education will be exclusive to the state/regions, while the last two items will be exclusive to the Federal Government.
Q8: What is proposed regarding the political classification of urban areas of Georgetown and New Amsterdam where the determination of ethnic predominance might be problematic?
A8: Cities, towns and other Municipalities. Through the constituency method of voting for the state assemblies and the Federal Upper House, should be able to articulate and represent specific ethnic interest?
Q9: What is the projected fate of normally centralized functions such as maintenance of births, deaths, national identities, passports and vehicles?
A9: Issuance and control of passports and national identity cards would be exclusively Federal functions, while the others would be state/regional functions with the Federal government being supplied with the necessary data for national reporting or analyses.
Q10: Will revenue collection be divested to these proposed units in relation to customs, excise and income tax levies? If not, what rationale is proposed for use in effecting the distribution of such tax revenues to the federating units?
A10: The three identified revenue authorities will be under concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal share allocated under a formula, which allows that entity the wherewithal to perform its constitutionally delegated functions. For Custom collections, the remainder of the revenues will be distributed to the state/region where the goods are destined, for excise ­ from where they originate and for income tax, to where the individual resides.
Q11: Is it proposed to obtain the consent of the general population for the implementation of this concept of Federalism? If so, what methodology is it proposed should be employed?
A11: Consent is proposed to be obtained by a referendum in which, if a majority in each of three of the four proposed states/regions vote for Federalism, then it should be implemented for the entire country."

Objections to the formal federalist proposals
Most of the objections to the federalist proposals have come from African Guyanese. In itself, this is a remarkable position, since minorities across the globe from Assam to Zimbabwe have been clamouring for federalist principles to be instituted to protect their interests against actual or potential majorities. The reason is that in Guyana, Africans, literally do not see themselves as a minority. Their history of having slaved to build the foundations of the country, their dominant Creole values, their occupancy of the key state institutions etc. have served to engender an entrenched belief of greater legitimacy to the national patrimony. The corollary, of course, until this belief is addressed, Africans will not concede legitimacy to a government perceived to be representative only of Indians. Federalism acknowledges the African right to a just share of their birthright.
Federalism and Partition
When the federalist proposals were first broached it was with a large measure of surprise that the present writer noted that many Guyanese, including some in the PPP and PNC, saw it as a Trojan horse for "partition". There may have been two reasons for this mistaken assumption. Firstly, back in the sixties, with the spectre of open ethnic conflict, Eusi Kwayana (then Sydney King) had proposed that the country be partitioned into three zones ­ one for Indians, one for Africans and the third for all those who wanted to live together. That this proposal may have been the minds of Guyanese forty years after its presentation leads to the second related, possible rationale. It is most likely that the ethnic conflict has proven so intractable for almost half a century that many Guyanese do not see any resolution and either desire partition or fear that the sentiment is so strong that given an inch with federalism, secessionist elements would quickly demand the "mile" of partition so as to get on with their lives.
Such sentiments cannot be ignored especially the pessimism concerning a peaceful future. Ironically, the experience of other states in similar circumstances has shown that if the tensions between the groups are not addressed the secessionist sentiments are more likely to emerge. In the case of Guyana, the populations are too mixed for any contemplated partition to be implemented without unacceptable levels of violence. Federalist approaches would deal directly with the Ethnic Security Dilemmas and would actually give relief in many other contested, valued areas. The Federalists have also included the entrenched constitutional stipulation that the states would not have the right to secede.

Federalism and Federation
During the discourse on federalism in the press, some Guyanese politicians, unfortunately, harking back to the failed W.I. Federation experiment, equated "Federation" with "Federalism". This may not have been surprising also because in the introduction as a political concept, with Swiss cantons (15th century) and Dutch provinces (16th century), the federal idea was synonymous with a "league" or an association of independent states joining together for some mutual benefit. The formation of United States of America with the promulgation of a new constitution in 1787, and more importantly, a series of contemporary articles later collated as "The Federalist Papers" introduced the modern meaning of the term.
The confusion in Guyana, however, was not only one arising out of ignorance of the meaning and distinction between the two terms, but a deliberate misstating of the premises of federalism by politicians who were opposed to the introduction of the concept to Guyana. The PPP especially took pains to misrepresent the premises of Federalism . This could possibly be due to their continued adherence to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, which promulgates "democratic-centralism" ­ a most centralised decision-making arrangement, totally opposed by federalism.

Small populations not viable:
It has been pointed out that that the populations of the proposed states may be too small to be viable. This criticism ignores the fact that right in Caricom there are a dozen full-fledged independent states that are doing much better than Guyana. It also looks at the population of Guyana as if it would be static; but if Guyana regains stability we can be sure that the population would rise. The original thirteen States of the US at the time of the union each had much smaller populations than today.
Prince Edward Island, a province of Canada has a population of only 136,000 while Switzerland has twenty-three cantons some with populations as small as thirty thousands. In 1999, Canada carved out a new territory - Nunavut - for its Inuits in the North who only number 25,000. Today, size is not as important as before in an integrated, globalised world where trade-bloc access guarantees markets. Improvement in technology creates efficiencies of production at increasingly smaller scales of production. Barbados, after all, is only one hundred and sixty-six square miles and has only 200,000 persons, yet its standard of living approaches developed country levels.
The State/regional governments would require too large a Bureaucracy:
The argument on the need for extra layers of bureaucrats that would prove to be a financial burden goes to the need for bureaucratic efficiency and cost ­ potent arguments. However, at its inception, the present Local Government structure was used to generate employment for party supporters of the PNC and this fat has never been rationalised. The system duplicates many activities performed at the Federal level and vice versa. The system presently has more workers than the proposed Federal system would need because of the streamlining effect of the clearer demarcation of responsibilities (exclusive competencies) that would be precipitated by the Federal reforms.
Guyana would be weakened to External threats:
It has been suggested that a Federal Guyana would bee weakened and become more vulnerable to external threats. This allegation is related to the accusation that federalism would lead to a break-up of the Guyanese state. As has been emphasised, Guyana will remain a sovereign state and the Federal Government having less to do may perform better at the duties left at that level such as Defence and External Affairs. The Army would be a federal institution that would be deployed primarily at our borders from where our major external threats will come.
Citizens would have to move or be restricted in their movements:
Since Guyana would remain as a single country, all citizens would be free to move throughout the country in an unhampered manner. The charge that citizens would have to move or be restricted in their movement arise from the unfounded assumption that the federalists are actually pursuing a secessionist agenda that would demand ethnically pure states. As explained above the latter strategy is not viable for Guyana. While States/Regions may set residency requirements for certain benefits, they would not be able to prohibit any Guyanese citizen from moving into a state or settling there.

Structural Factors dealing with the Ethnic Security Dilemmas

Addressing the African Ethnic Security Dilemma
The formal/structural aspects of federalism will immediately tackle the African Ethnic Security Dilemma. Violence in plural societies erupts from a confluence of experience or perceptions by one or more groups that is being denied its legitimate share or power and the national patrimony. This is the situation with African Guyanese. We suggest that because of our ethnic pattern of geographical distribution, federalism can be an effective mechanism to assist in an equitable sharing of power and patrimony in Guyana.
The proposed demarcation of the state boundaries would be based along the historical counties' boundaries inherited from the Dutch in 1803 ­ Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice. Essequibo would be further subdivided into the Rupununi which would encompass the present regions eight and nine and the remainder that would retain the designation "Essequibo". Under the last census, Demerara has sixty percent Africans; Berbice has seventy-five percent Indians; Rupununi ninety nine percent Amerindians and Essequibo sixty percent Indians. At State elections, an African led party should be capable of obtaining Executive office in Demerara and this will effectively abolish "winner takes all politics", which is inherent in a unitary state structure, especially in the absence of national coalitions.
Africans will have control of the most developed state in Guyana ­ with the only international airport, three industrial estates, most manufacturing, the capital and major city with the headquarters of all major companies, main campus of the University of Guyana, Teachers Training College, Cultural Center, major Hotels, - and the opportunity to experience Governance.
Some have objected to this proposal by pointing out that one would simply be transferring the political violence to one level below. This misapprehends the African Security Dilemma. The latter is triggered when it is calculated that Indians will dominate everything in Guyana. Control of Demerara, the most developed State is not an inconsiderable prize, especially since other innovations will also give them a share of the national pie. The Indian minority will not resort to violence since their dilemma has not been one of fear of total domination. Indians, based on their history, should still be confident of holding their own economically, even though they are giving up their majoritorian "advantage" under the present system. .
Addressing the Indian Ethnic Security Dilemma
The Indian Ethnic Security Dilemma stems from the overwhelming preponderance of Africans, who are their political opponents, in the Disciplined Forces. The composition of these Forces should reflect the composition of the population, as is generally accepted in all modern countries. In a Federal Guyana, since each State will have its own, independent Police Force, this will make this policy much easier to implement. Additionally it is proposed that Georgetown should have its own Metro-police while a Central Crime Lab, under the direction of the Federal Government should be accessible to all the State Police bodies. Under such an arrangements it is highly unlikely that there will be any retrenchments or diminution of recruits from the African Guyanese community, which is a real concern in the present. The bottom line for all the States would be that composition requirements for the Forces should be stated in terms of goals rather than quotas. While overall, Africans would be giving up their "advantage " under the present system, the political space gained should be seen as redounding to their greater good.
The revival of the GuyanaPeoples' Militia as the Home Guards in the individual States to act as a reservoir for recruitment into the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) ­ a Federalist institution - would also assist in making the GDF a more ethnically representative Force.

Addressing the Amerindian Ethnic Security Dilemma
The Amerindian Ethnic Security Dilemma is that even though they are the first inhabitants of Guyana, and it is their land that was forcibly expropriated going back to the "discovery of the New World" by the Europeans. Under the present political system they are a small minority of eight percent who will never obtain the opportunity to be in charge of their own affairs ­ to break the shackles of paternalism that has stultified their growth over the past centuries.
For the first time in the history of Guyana, under federalism, Amerindians will have control of their own affairs in the State of Rupununi which would actually be comprised of all of the present Regions 8 and 9. There has been much talk of the future Guyana having a "continental destiny". This has not taken hold or been given shape as a strategy for the development of Guyana because the decision makers are all located in Georgetown with their eyes cast northwards. With Rupununi having its own State government, and becoming the home of the federal capital, it is inevitable that their focus will be southwards. Additionally, it is not appreciated, especially by the politicians, enough that our Amerindian citizens all have fellow tribes people on the Brazilian side of the border and they will form valuable cross-border linkages. In addition to their governance of their own state, Amerindians should retain control of lands in other states granted to them under the Amerindian Act.
In general, federalism reduces disparities between groups by actually forcing underrepresented groups to participate in government, education, economic development and all the other activities of the modern state. This is most appropriate to the Amerindian predicament since they will have the guarantee at the state level of receiving the experience, which may catapult them into the national arena.

Miscellaneous Objections to Structural factors
Ethnic conflict would simply be pushed one level below, since each state in Guyana would still be multiethnic:
This criticism misunderstands the thrust of "Integrative Federalism". The motive for resolving the ethnic conflict is not to have ethnically homogenous populations but in fact to have multiethnic states preferably where in each state, one particular ethnic group constitutes a large majority. Under such conditions, the members of that ethnic group, assured that their group will win at the polls under whatever combination, will more easily form separate political parties to compete for office. In this increased intra-ethnic rivalry scenario, there will be every incentive for one or more groups from the majority section to seek alliances with the minority section and thus moderate their rhetoric. This scenario would apply to Berbice where Indians are seventy-five as opposed to twenty-three percent Africans. In Guyana the overt conflict between Africans and Indians has only been precipitated in Demerara where Indians are a minority of forty percent and the Africans would be the large majority. Africans would not have the feeling of "losing it all" which is what fuels their onslaught against the system.

Federalism would lead to uneven and lagging development for Demerara:
Some have claimed that federalism would lead to lagging development of Demerara. This is a racist fear grounded on a false assumption that African Guyanese would not be able to run an efficient state. Many Guyanese equate the disastrous record of the PNC regime with the capabilities of African Guyanese, since most of the key officials, managers and public servants were Africans. However, there are many other factors that influence the performance of a government not the least being ideology, policies driven by that ideology, racism, world factors etc. Ten years of spectacularly inefficient and corrupt governance by the PPP, dominated by Indians, should disabuse all Guyanese that any one race has a monopoly on technical and managerial know-how, venality, or nepotism.
Procedural/Structural Factors: Benefits
Splitting the Vote and Rejoining the Vote
One of the most recurrent (and plaintive) question from a significant number of Guyanese, tired of the ethnic censuses that pass for elections is, "why can't we be Guyanese"? Most of the time, Guyanese are "Guyanese" who mix and shop and go to school and work together. The problem arises around general elections time and comes from the irrefutable rational conclusion of these same individuals that "their' side may win it all and precipitating the contradictory question, "why split the vote"? These individuals who rail at the lack of Guyanese unity go along because, "what else is the choice"? This line of reasoning ensures ethnic voting and precipitates the ethnic dilemmas that provide the context for extreme behaviour.
The only time the individual will split his vote under the present state of mistrust is if he is convinced his side could not lose with his "defection". And this is what separating the Indian vote into the two Indian dominated States of Essequibo and Berbice will achieve. Indians will know that no matter how he votes an Indian party will come out ahead. The demonstrator effect will be the most significant gain: that the sky did not fall when he "splits" his vote. It will be easier to transfer this pattern to national elections after some experience with "splitting the vote" at state elections.
Additionally, since the electorate is now split, rivalry within ethnic groups [intra-ethnic rivalry], should increase since, for instance, Indian politicians - dominant in Berbice - will see themselves as rivals for power at the centre. This intra-ethnic rivalry should increase since, if particular ethnic groups are overwhelmingly dominant in separate states, they should not feel threatened by "out" groups. This also removes the incentives to calls for "not splitting the votes", and "vote for your own". Conversely, rivalry between ethnic groups (inter-ethnic rivalry), should decrease due to the lessened possibility of a majority seizing all power for all time. Conflict is thus engineered away from the centre towards local levels, where the stakes are much lower and can be more easily contained. And also away from between ethnic groups, where the intensity can reach the most bestial levels.

Bargaining and the Ethnic Security Dilemma
Government of National Reconciliation
The political struggle in Guyana is a life and death one because the prize is so great ­ an authoritarian centralised with unlimited powers to decide "who gets what and how". Each "side" can be persuaded that under the present rules, with just a little more push, they can "have it all". Under federalism, the centre will not possess all power and the struggle to control should not be as intense as in the present. It should then provide less incentive to lock groups out of the Executive, and should therefore encourage the possibilities of national coalitions for the National Executive. The unlikeness of the politicians giving up power, which is one on the stumbling blocks to present Consociationalist executive power-sharing proposals, should be somewhat assuaged.
It is proposed that a Government of National Reconciliation be constituted for at least one term of five years to demonstrate to all the various groups that their representatives are involved at the highest level to bargain on their behalf as power is allocated for the future through Constitutional entrenchment.

Contextual Coalitions
Federalism will encourage cooperation and coalitions at the centre, depending on the specific issue being debated there. These coalitions can cut across ethnic lines due to the diverse demands that would emanate from the different states. Berbice might have a common position with Demerara to push for the development of say, Bauxite, which may be opposed by Essequibo focusing on Gold. This type of shifting alliance should introduce a fluidity to Guyanese politics, which has never been present. As political parties move away from bipolar confrontation, towards a more multi-polar balance, they should lower the temperature of their polemics. After all, today's rival may become tomorrow's ally. It is the negotiation of these issues that the bonds are forged between politicians who may then proceed to more permanent relationships.

3. CENTRALISED POWER
Integrative federalism in Guyana to disperse power

Local Government System Proposals
There is no disagreement among all the political parties of Guyana that governmental functions and powers are too centralised. This is not surprising in light of the manifest failures of the integral state that had been created by 1985. Even the multilateral International Financial Institutions (IFI's) have had occasion to criticise this aspect of Guyanese governance. Several of the international UN agencies, such as PAHO have insisted that their programs be implemented in a decentralised fashion. In fact PAHO's areas of demarcation fall exactly as the proponents of federalism have proposed the new state boundaries.
Following the Constitutional Reform process in 1999 (precipitated by violent street protests and ethnic violence) the PPP and PNC instituted a Special Committee on Local Government Reform and the recommendations are soon to be tabled in the National Assembly. It is reported that while the village councils will be strengthened in a move to make governance more responsive to local needs, the reforms still see local Government in terms of "decentralisation" where there will remain a "centre". And this is the contradiction in the proposals of the PPP, PNC and all those who claim that "power must be returned to the people".
Desmond Hoyte, who had been the architect of the Regional decentralisation initiative introduced in 1980 began to loosen up the state functions on his accession to the Presidency in 1985 but like the leaders of the PPP who succeeded him in office, rejected Federalism even though all of them have complained about the failure of the present arrangements. For instance, the PNC, in its submission to the Constitution Reform Commission in May 1999 had proposed that:
"There can be no real democracy without a strong, vibrant local government system. This system would provide for the decentralization of power, the devolution of authority, and the participation of large numbers of people in the decision-making process in their communitiesThere should be a clear understanding and acceptance that the Regional Democratic Councils and the smaller Local Democratic Organs are part of the Local Government system and not agencies of the Central Government. To this end, therefore, the RDC's should now be organized accordingly. They should exercise the power to raise revenues by taxation and otherwise and be responsible for a range of activities in their respective Regions as identified by law "
The PNC was recommending that the powers and "legal framework" of the RDC's should be constitutionally enshrined. If this is to be done then the only difference in their proposal on the question of allocation of competencies would be to add the federalist stricture that the central government cannot unilaterally alter the defined powers of the regions. Passing further "lesser" laws will not convince the centre to keep out of local affairs. If the PNC and PPP are serious about the Regions having the powers to execute their programs they should be aware that in the past the centre always altered the regional powers by diminishing them. They may have other reasons for rejecting federalism but not the need to have a less centralised government.
Even in a homogenous society, federalism offers many advantages over a unitary state structure. Following Montesquieu , James Madison saw it as a device to vertically split, the powers of an always potentially tyrannical Government, controlled by a potentially tyrannical majority. (Much as the separation of Governmental powers into executive, legislative and judicial branches will do horizontally. In a federal system, the country is divided geographically and politically into three layers of governance ­ a federal entity that encompasses the entire country; several states, regions or provinces, and a third layer of Government (local or municipal government) much as the present local government in Guyana has it.
But unlike the "regional system" created by the PNC, however, the powers or "competencies" of each province would be constitutionally defined and changes in the Federal or States powers would have to be mutually agreed on. The central government would not be able to unilaterally change the power relations. Each State, at a minimum would have its own administration - headed by a Governor, its own Police Force, and the power to tax and spend. These powers are not to the exclusion of the Federal Government's, which would adopt an overarching national perspective and normally have complete control of defence and foreign affairs. Its national domestic program supplements, and is coordinated with, the provinces' programs. In Guyana we can envisage at least four states - Berbice, Demerara, Essequibo, and Rupununi, but these demarcations can be adjusted depending on the will of the people.
New Federal Capital
It is proposed that a new federal capital be established in the Rupunini. This will accomplish several objectives presently articulated by Guyanese. The "continental destiny" that has been touted will only become reality when Guyanese began to turn their eyes into the continent. The new capital will accomplish this. With the proposed road to Brazil connecting Lethem, Linden and New Amsterdam, it would be logical to build the new capital at Lethem. The road and the proposed deep water harbour at New Amsterdam should help to create new centres of power, to complement Georgetown, and these would act as dynamos to push the country's development and rectify the present distorted economic, social and cultural development.

Second Chamber of Parliament
Many theorists of ethnic conflict resolution point to the positive gains achieved if there is a second legislative chamber that can, among other functions, safeguard ethnic interests ­ especially ethnic minority rights. A federal structure will facilitate the formation of a second chamber in the legislature. Because, as we mentioned earlier, each state would have ethnically different majorities, the representation drawn from state-constituencies would most likely reflect the ethnic diversity of Guyana. This fortuitous circumstance gives Guyanese the opportunity of securing ethnic representation without resorting to devices such as separate electoral rolls. This second chamber should have the power to scrutinize all legislation in general, but specifically enumerated powers in reference to ethnic issues.

Local Government
The prolonged period of authoritarian government has unquestionedly destroyed much of the initiative and competence of the local communities to manage their own affairs. We agree with the renewed focus on the revival of the Village Councils, reportedly contained in the latest local government proposals. After the abolition of slavery in 1834 the freed African slaves had established several villages on their own initiative. They created Village Councils to run the affairs of their communities and these Councils were the incubators of much of the leadership in the African community and formed their links to the county and national Governments. The Councils, through its various committees such as drainage etc., was able to develop local expertise in managing organisations. The introduction of the National Democratic Committees (NDC's) that agglomerated several villages into one entity, while on paper may have appeared as a logical progression of the Village Council arrangement, ignored the historical and geographical realities of the village movement. Residents were still focused on problems in their particular village and this focus as reinforced by the geographical fact that the village are strung linearly along the single main road and are each separated from their neighbours by canals.
As discussed earlier, the Indians remained on the sugar plantations for another century after slavery and those who moved off, in the main, remained rural bound. The new and massive housing schemes created by the sugar companies from the early fifties, were all centred on the plantations and the affairs of these communities were run by a Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Fund (SILWF) that perpetuated the paternalistic rule of the "big manager" of the plantation. The new Indian villages formed outside the ambit of the sugar plantations, on rented land, did no establish village councils and so to an extent far greater than the African community they are deficient in the mechanics of running and organising their local affairs.
The Amerindians were always the most excluded from the running of their own affairs. Their traditional village structures were undermined by the Catholic Church, which, in a de facto manner, assumed administration over them. Subsequent to the Regionalisation plan, the both the PNC and PPP Governments have attempted to resuscitate the indigenous village governance structures. In early 2004, the PPP initiated a training program to inculcate the rudiments of village governance in the Tachaus or chiefs of the various villages. Any revival of the Village Movement in other parts of Guyana will have to be accompanied by an intensive program of education in the running of these bodies. The community will have to receive a new focus for several reasons but primarily because it has been neglected by policymakers in not realising its role in the organisation of the activities of the citizenry. It is only a federalist approach that can guarantee the focus on local development.

4. ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION

In Guyana, there have been two sets of concerns raised, not entirely unconnected, about economic distribution, and both have raised the issue of distributive justice. Firstly there have been concerns about the overall economic policy of the PPP favouring Indians at the expense of Africans. Charges of "marginalisation" and even "economic genocide" have been made by the African Guyanese community during the PPP's regime, echoing the similar cries of the Indians during the PNC's rule between 1964-1992. Secondly there has been the historical complaint about the uneven geographically development ­ specifically, that Demerara in general, and Georgetown in particular, receives a disproportionate share of the national developmental thrust. These complaints, which are grounded on a perception that justice is not being served, have been some of the main fuels of the ethnic fire.
What we have seen is that in severely divided societies, governmental policies will not be judged by intentions but by results and even in that case, results will be judged by very subjective criteria. Certain policies, which may appear facially neutral, can have differential ethnic impact. Take for instance the economic policy we mentioned earlier - agricultural development in Guyana. From a standpoint of comparative advantage, it makes sense for Guyana to concentrate on agricultural development in the near term but since Indians dominate this sector, we can be sure that African Guyanese will have severe problems, as they have demonstrated before, with a strategy that focuses on agriculture. It will be futile to argue that it is the most "economically feasible" choice. The economic policy of the government is then very important in securing justice, and ethnic peace in Guyana.
After a period of rapid growth engendered by the Economic Recovery Program, beginning in 1991, where the economy expanded primarily in the traditional areas that had collapsed, it ran out of steam. The growth rate since 1997 has not even reached an average of one percent ­ far below the eight to ten percent deemed necessary to make initiate a self sustaining level of prosperity. The evidence has made it evident by now that the economic regime imposed by the Washington Consensus is necessary but not sufficient to facilitate a level of growth sufficient to ensure the requisite growth rate.
To stimulate such a necessary high growth rate the creation of a Catalytic Entrepreneurial State is proposed. To assure an even distribution of development between the various ethnic groups, an 'Ethnic Impact Statement" and an Affirmative Action Program are proposed.

Strong vs. Weak State: Unitary vs. Federalist State
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Guyana, as with many other third world states, had a disastrous experience with state involvement in development during the 70's and 80's and this has obviously soured the World Bank's enthusiasm for dirigeste policies. Out of this experience has arisen a not unreasonable fear of a "strong" state. The flawed premise of this fear, however, is to assume that the form of the state itself has to be constant, as it is used to perform large and more varied tasks. As we described earlier, the Guyanese state as it developed since 1621, was a very centralised one and this condition was an integral part of the problem of retard development, even before the seventies. Evidence from across the world`, however has shown that a strong state does not have to be a centralised one. Federalism can address the fear while delivering the needed performance. The functions of the state can be distributed into multiple layers and segments so as to deliver a greater likelihood of success of development goals.
Even with the unitary state, not all state actions are negative and in fact there may be the necessity for government interventions when the free market or community coordinating mechanisms are stymied for one reason or other - market failure or community breakdown. This is clearly exemplified by the fact that since 1997, the Guyanese banks have been awash with money and yet cannot translate that into investments, creating a liquidity problem. After the Guyanese experience with the failure of the World Bank/IBM market dominated approach, we propose that the State has to be transformed into one that is as small as possible but at the same time we have to insist that it should be as large as necessary to ensure that we move ourselves out of poverty in as short a time as possible. This expansion of the role of the state does not mean that Guyana has to repeat the mistakes of her past.
Guyana's development plans during the 70's and 80's were driven by State ownership of production (State Capitalism) which destroyed the market and community forces necessary for competition and other coordinating activities necessary for sustainable growth. The socialist dogmas undergirding the then development policies were inimical to the free market and self reliant communities and spawned a culture of special interests seeking to benefit from the state policies (rent seeking). The World Bank is insisting that Guyana should learn from its experience as to the downside risks of a large governmental role in industrial policy and act to minimise those risks. This perspective is nor unreasonable but they cannot ignore the fact that no country in the modern era has risen out of poverty on loans from World Bank/IMF and without directed government intervention.
The PPP Government evidently agrees with the World Bank's position that providing a stable macro-environment will attract enough investment high economic growth. Unfortunately, after analysing the methodology used by other countries were able to create investment opportunities and how these were realised in a sustainable manner, the prospects do not look good for Guyana ­ and its ethnic relations. Apart from the fact that there may be other, non-economic, factors inhibiting investment ­ such as political instability - investment and the consequent economic growth is not just a question of creating institutional environments but rather one of creating institutional arrangements. Theory must be guided by successful practice.
The history of Europe and the US and the Far East has shown that the state played a major role in their development, "by mobilising savings, providing infrastructure, shaping sectoral priorities, and in many cases forcing individual agents to engage in market-oriented activities through taxation." It is rather ironic that the World Bank/IMF have virtually eschewed any meaningful role for the state in achieving desired growth rates, in the face of such evidence. The litmus of proposed activities would be for the state to implement policies that strengthen market and community coordination to promote growth and development.

Proposals: Promoting Growth
Catalytic Entrepreneurial State
It is proposed that there be created what can be labelled a "Catalytic Entrepreneurial State" (CES). Such a state will firstly have to be a responsible state, with a strong commitment to development and simultaneously working assiduously to increase its legitimacy. The latter perspective is vitally necessary for Guyana, given the ethnic cleavages existent in the society. The Government's relationship with, and the quality of, the Public Service is an area of critical concern in the formation of a CES. In whatever endeavour the State engages, much will depend on the professionalism of the Civil Servants for the success of the articulated goals. The Government is presently engaged in reforming the Civil Service ­ but the Government has not been clear in what context such reforms will take place. The Government must first make a clear determination as to the role of the state before it can decide on the size and competence of the Civil Service. In the context of Guyana ethnic politics, a clear articulation of the nature and role of the Civil Service should ease some of the suspicions between the PPP and African Guyanese.
The CES will also have to be a "facilitative State' as the World Bank has been insisting. There are no problems with the propositions that the Government will play a regulatory role to restore (and maintain) markets to their proper function (clearing markets). Similarly Government will have to provide education, primary healthcare and infrastructure. While public finances have increased in this area under the PPP, the corruption that is evident in the awarding of contracts in the capital aspects of these programs have left a bitter taste in the mouths of many Guyanese ­especially Africans. And many are sceptical and even bitter about any suggestion that the Government should take a more interventionist role in economic development. The Government will also have to play a more vibrant role in reconstituting the communities as the loci of initiative and development. Federalist principles of governance are necessary for the success of such a policy.
There is no one shoe that fits all. The World Bank, or anyone else, cannot simply insist that "free markets" alone must be used to fuel our development. There is not anything as pure "free markets" alone running any economy. We have mentioned above the different roles played by the state, markets and communities. The task of governments is not to stand on dogmas but to tailor the right mix of these three institutions to suit their concrete conditions. The Western countries developed through a high level of dependence on markets but their governments and communities also played and continue to play crucial roles. They took a couple of hundred of years to get where they are. Japan, on the other hand, because of its unique societal values, depended much more on the role of the community and trust. Their development to catch up with the West took one century.
Without question, markets played crucial roles but compared to the West, the State and communities played much greater roles in guiding and fostering development. After WWII, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore took only a half a century for their development program to catch up. But again, they did not rely totally on market mechanisms and determined their unique institutional mix of markets, state and community to coordinate their economic activities, based on their own circumstances.
A pragmatic approach to development is necessary because the cause of our underdevelopment is to some extent strategic rather than structural. Korea and Singapore were right where we were fifty years ago, if not behind us, not only statistically but structurally. Their Governments, as catalysts, set strategic goals and then did what was necessary too back into them. Take for instance one reason why the "import substitution strategy" model of development ­ the last round of Government intervention ­ practiced by so many countries, including Guyana, failed. They assisted and protected domestic industries that became inefficient and non-innovative since the market forces fostering competition were destroyed.

Promoting Growth
Market orientation vs. market control
Korea and Singapore, however, followed the Japanese example and explicitly tied assistance to selected private industries based on their commitment and ability to export. This strategic decision had two significant and faithful results that differed from the "import substitution strategy". Firstly, the assisted firms were subjected to the market discipline of the competition of international trade. This was the most intense competition and ensured that efficiencies and productivities had to be raised to the highest levels. These firms not only couldn't afford to be fat and lazy like the protected ones in Guyana, they had to become world class ­ and they've remained world class. The second benefit, of course, was that the exports brought in foreign exchange and there was no need to ban anything to save foreign exchange. They engaged in market rather than market control.
In summary, "markets may successfully orient individual agents to allocate resources efficiently but they are not sufficient to coordinate individual actions over a long period of time and, most importantly for our purpose, towards desired social goals such as specified rates of growth. Market orientation is not sufficient to generate market coordination toward collective prosperity." This is where the catalytic function of the State comes in.

Federalist Protection against Centralised Development
However, if we are going to give the state a larger role, we cannot be oblivious to our history on the proclivity of central governments to agglomerate and misuse its powers, as outlined in so many instances above. There will exist the danger of any government in charge of economic policy to misuse their authority. The Federalist arrangement deals with this contingency. The goals of MITI and the Government would be set through the annual meetings of the President of the Republic and the Governors of the States where in addition they would discuss revenue sharing and other matters of coordination.

Distributive policies

Distributive policies are focused towards reducing primarily the gross representational disparities in 'valued' areas, which are found between groups. The name itself suggests that something has to be distributed and this would assume at least things ­ firstly that there would have to be some mechanism to do the distribution and secondly that there has to be some principle based on "equality" to determine the criteria for the distribution. Distributive policies are based on some notion "distributive justice" such as the utilitarian principle that the distribution must benefit the greatest number, or the socialist creed "to each according to their need" or the merit principle. i.e. that the government of a country should actively intervene to ensure that the citizens of a country achieve some sort equality in those "valued areas" ­ which could range from material goods to achieve a minimum standard of living, cultural goods to live authentically without feeling "second class", or having equitable access to the power structure to ensure consultation in the decision making processes of the state.
Distributive policies could be based on using the individual as the basis for the distribution such as equal opportunity laws, which are supposed to ensure that all individuals situated in similar circumstances are treated equally. In Guyana however, it is asserted by both the Indian and African communities that when their party is out of office the "other" discriminated against them and therefore there is need for rectification when one's group has recaptured office.

Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action
Federal Protection
In a free enterprise system there can be no guarantee of access to the ends: one may institute laws to enforce equal opportunity, but there can be guarantee of outcomes. The favourite example suggests that equal opportunity laws, on their own, are akin to having an individual whose legs have been broken, be told that he now has an equal opportunity to run a race. This perspective raises the question as to whether affirmative action is needed to rectify any historic imbalances. Firstly even though the policies of every government had affirmative action as an implicit premise they have never been willing a specific need excepting as it affects the Amerindians. Distributive policies are not defined as such, excepting for the Amerindians ­ they are the only group that is acknowledged to have explicit group needs.
It appears that each political party wants to correct real or perceived historic imbalances but not accept that their group needs help above the principle of equal treatment or opportunity.

In areas such as business and agriculture, where it is not simply a matter of affirmative hiring practices, long term training programs would have to be established to ensure viability of the programs. The dismal failure of the co-op projects in the 1970's where land and resources were simply given over to primarily African Guyanese, without the necessary preparatory training and support should be an object lesson for policy makers. In addition care has to be taken that 'affirmative action' policies taken do not lead to a dependency syndrome being created in the beneficiaries. Rather than set rigid quotas, participation goals can be targeted within a set time frame. Percentage participation targets be established in key sectors of the economy to ensure the equitable representation of all ethnic groups in the society.

Ethical Perspective
Even John Rawls, a most influential modern political theorist, who accepted the deontological ethical premise (that the "right" precedes the "good") had to agree that in arriving at principles for constituting a society, one would have to first accept some skeletal ("thin") idea of the "good". In this sense we are all consequentialists who are committed towards living together as a society and would accept at a minimum that it is to everyone's good that a prime cause of societal instability should be removed. For those more concerned about questions of justice rather than beneficence, one consideration that has to be placed at the fore is whether procedural equality should take precedence over the substantive equality that affirmative action implies.
From this perspective, the backward looking standard of compensatory justice is not being invoked. The focus is on the future ­ the creation of a more stable society - and increased public welfare for all Guyanese because affirmative action rightly compensates for the loss of present competitive ability caused by stifled diversity. Most modern theories of justice could support affirmative action ­ especially in the restricted area of the composition of state institutions.
US Experience
In terms of governmental laws or actions that may have a discriminatory impact, in the West, the U.S. has had the most experience in dealing with the issue: the US Supreme Court's "rational basis test" declares that a legislative classification may be upheld only if it bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. More to the point before us in Guyana, however, is that there are certain classifications that our Constitution itself defines as being afforded specific protection against discrimination. These are inevitably classifications that particular societies have in their historical development found to have been violated in such a sustained, pervasive and invidious fashion that they are universally held deserving of higher protection by society. The traditional ones are race, colour or creed, place of origin, political opinions and these are given a higher level of scrutiny to justify "legitimate governmental purposes".
In Guyana we recently increased the number of classifications that should receive higher constitutional protection to include religion, gender, age, sex etc. Sexual orientation was adjudged as not befitting of this higher scrutiny. We should note however that even from within these favoured categories our Constitution explicitly (unlike the US) singles some groups for special (and therefore unequal) treatment. For instance, one ethnic group ­ the Amerindians were selected for specific benefits as opposed to other ethnic groups. Art. 149G "Indigenous peoples shall have the right to the protection. Preservation and promulgation of their languages, cultural heritage and way of life." And so on.
The point is that even the "protected" classifications against discriminatory governmental action may be affected on occasions. In the US, the Supreme Court has determined that such occasions are "inherently suspect" and the legitimacy of such occasions should be determined by a higher level of review - "strict scrutiny". The Court would consider: a) the purpose of the ethnic-specific (for instance) policy; b) whether the decision utilizing the classification can reasonably be expected to promote the purpose intended; c) whether the means are the least intrusive. In one very famous case, the Court decided that a University's affirmative action program based on the need to increase racial diversity in the school was in valid furtherance of the "societal good". In our case, if we were to set a goal of , say, a higher percentage of Africans receive Government contractswithin a specified timetable, this would be singling out one group for special treatment. We would have to determine by the strict scrutiny test whether the policy was constitutional. We believe it would be.
A federalist structure assists in the process of ensuring that justice is done by providing a second level of judicial access ­ the Federal Court ­ to have their rights enforced.

Part IV

Conclusion

PRINCIPLE FOR ESTABLISHING SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
Justice as Fairness

The philosopher Immanuel Kant succinctly posed the dilemma of organising a just state, two centuries ago, in these terms:
"The problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem, can be solved, even for a race of devils, if only they are intelligent. The problem is, given a multitude of rational beings requiring universal laws for their preservation, but each of them is sincerely inclined to exempt himself from them, to establish a Constitution in such a way, although their private intentions conflict, they check each other, with the result that their public conduct is the same as if they had no such intentions."

In Guyana there exist great suspicions in the people as to the motives of those who propose "solutions" to our national problems. Throughout our history institutions have been tinkered with, purportedly for the "good" of the people, but invariably it was later seen to have benefited either one person, or one group. Guyanese are understandably concerned about the "smartman" who jockeys for advantage on behalf of himself or his group. The initiative, or set of initiatives, that are offered to address Guyana's political crisis will have to engender broad acceptance across the political, ethnic and other divisions in the people and especially amongst the politicians. This implies that the various groups, as they define themselves, would have to agree on the proposals for establishing the institutions to govern them.
Kant proposed that the solution to the inevitable conflicts in organised human societies, lay in the design of institutions that should ensure the persons behaving in accordance with its rules, are behaving justly and morally. Most commentators who followed him agreed with his stricture that institutions constituting a state must be organised in accordance with the principle of justice, but his criterion of the categorical imperative, proved nettlesome. John Rawls, the most influential of modern liberal political philosophers, came up with another formulation to guide the formation of social institutions nearly two centuries later, in 1971. It had the great virtue of simplicity.
In the opening line of his first section in his magnum opus A Theory of Justice, Rawls boldly declared that the principle of "justice" is the standard that would generate the broad acceptability for the establishment of any institution necessary to implement any initiative for enduring stability: "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought." Recognizing that Guyana does not even reach Rawls' definition of a society as "a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is typically marked by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests." his definition of "justice" is very pertinent to our effort to construct a democratic state in Guyana: "a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation."
More importantly, Rawls introduced a methodology for arriving at substantive principles for making decisions in divisive situations such as we have in Guyana, where it is vital that the decisions are seen as not favouring any one constituency. Procedurally, Rawls proposed that we make our suggestions about the fundamental principles that will structure and govern society, from behind a metaphorical "veil of ignorance" that precludes us from taking into consideration our personal position, class, gender, race, religion, even intelligence or interests in the matter under consideration. This justice as fairness would provide the requisite objectivity and impartiality in judgment necessary to engender the requisite trust "since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favour his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain." With such principles, we would be willing to go along even if our enemies assign us positions in the society arising out of the contract. With such principles we would not formulate, for instance, rules that would put minorities at a disadvantage since we could possibly be members of a minority group.
In Guyana we have to all appreciate that the existence of the state itself is for the furtherance of the societal good ­ the public interest. Ultimately all Guyanese are looking to be culturally authentic, politically secure and economically sound. In the furtherance of these "public goods", the people have to promulgate a constitution through which the government directs the state through policies and programs in consonance with the prime directives of the Constitution. In modern democracies, under the liberal paradigm, equality of treatment and equality before the law of the citizens stands at the very top of the imperatives. We have proposed that under a federalist state institutions will be created to implement the policies of Ethnic Impact Statements, multiculturalism, federal form of government, Government of National Reconciliation, Catalytic Economic State, Affirmative Action etc. in the fulfilment of the national goals.
However, because each individual citizen or group of citizens are situated differently (according to specific criteria) governmental policies and programs will inevitably have a different impact on different citizens. Our tax laws are designed to extract a greater percentage of the income of the rich than the poor. In fact we have decided that citizens earning below a certain threshold do not have to pay any taxes. While the rich may think that the law is discriminatory ­ they are not being treated equally - and it is, we accept it because we feel it is morally justified in furtherance of the societal good. In Guyana, our Constitution itself, while it promulgates equality and forbids discrimination, in Art. 149 has just changed from Art 29 the stipulation that "Women and men have equal rights" to "Women's participation in the various management and decision-making processes" We accept these things because they are part of our general moral assumptions ­ they are right because they further our conception of the national good.
And this is the ultimate test that is used in both ethical and legal theories to evaluate state activity affecting citizens in society ­ especially when it is claimed that a particular affects some citizens differently. The task of the Government is to ensure that their differential treatment is not arbitrary and capricious and irrational ­ and that they further some societal good. There should be a correlation between the classification and the purpose of the statute so that citizens can presume the impartiality of the legislators. Thus even those adversely impacted may consider it an acceptable cost of achieving a larger societal goal.
In Guyana a feeling of injustice is pervasive in all groups in the society as they struggle to live in dignity ­ especially within the political, economic and cultural spheres. The history of Guyana has demonstrated the importance of contexts in the introduction of institutions into society ­ whether these be in the political, economic or cultural spheres. The institutions will have to be seen as just. Rules that go against the values and morals of a people or lead to injustice, will be observed in the breach or not at all; the institution will at best be ignored or at worse lead to dysfunctional social behaviour.
In Guyana we would have to derive our substantive principles of justice for ourselves based on our history and present realities. Slavery and indentureship have been the two historical forces that have had the greatest impact on our collective psyche and our disparate cultures. Out of our experiences where they were denied, the values of liberty and equality are central to what we desire for the "good life". These values must be central to any institution that seeks to address any aspect of our national life, including the ones proposed in this paper.
Federalism is founded on a conception of human nature that places these values at its centre and imbues all institutions within its framework. It is a way of organising society that balances the inevitable contradictory pulls of unity and diversity immanent in any agglomeration of humanity but even more so one as diverse as ours, and yet achieve justice between the groups in the groups of the society. As we try to achieve our self-defined goals of securing justice in cultural autonomy, and political and economic distribution there is no alternative to adopting federalist principles to guide all proposed institutions.